Educational choices and family outcomes by Artmann, Elisabeth Maria
VU Research Portal




Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication in VU Research Portal
citation for published version (APA)
Artmann, E. M. (2021). Educational choices and family outcomes.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
E-mail address:
vuresearchportal.ub@vu.nl
Download date: 13. Dec. 2021
EDUCATIONAL CHOICES AND FAMILY OUTCOMES
ISBN 978 90 361 0648 1
Cover design: Crasborn Graphic Designers bno, Valkenburg a.d. Geul
This book is no. 779 of the Tinbergen Institute Research Series, established through
cooperation between Rozenberg Publishers and the Tinbergen Institute. A list of books
which already appeared in the series can be found in the back.
VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT
Educational choices and family outcomes
ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT
ter verkrijging van de graad Doctor of Philosophy aan
de Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam,
op gezag van de rector magnificus
prof.dr. V. Subramaniam,
in het openbaar te verdedigen
ten overstaan van de promotiecommissie
van de School of Business and Economics
op donderdag 22 april 2021 om 11.45 uur




geboren te Viechtach, Duitsland
promotoren: prof.dr. B. van der Klaauw
prof.dr. H. Oosterbeek
Acknowledgements
Looking at my completed dissertation, I cannot believe how quickly the past six years
and my time in Amsterdam, first at Tinbergen Institute and then at the VU, have gone
by. During this journey I met many wonderful people who supported me or contributed
in one way or another to this dissertation. I want to mention some of them in particular.
First and foremost, I thank Bas van der Klaauw and Hessel Oosterbeek for being my
supervisors in the last five years. Without their encouragement, support and patience,
this dissertation would not have been possible. At times they seemed more optimistic
about it than I was and to this day I still don’t know where they took that optimism
from. Their critical and constructive feedback improved this dissertation tremendously.
Co-authoring with them taught me a lot about how to conduct (empirical) research and
how to write papers.
I am grateful to my colleagues at the VU for all the lunches, coffee breaks, and
research- and nonresearch-related discussions we had. Diana, Dieter, Martin, Phillip,
David, Davíd, Hermon, Nynke, Sándor, Lennart, Jurre, Coen, Benjamin, Sabien, Pieter
and Pienke all made my time at the VU so much more enjoyable and enriching. Yeorim,
thanks for being the best office mate I could have wished for, and more importantly, a
great friend. Zichen, thank you for your friendship, help and advice since the first year
of TI. I am also grateful to Nadine and Paul for giving me the opportunity to go to the
University of Gothenburg for a research visit.
To avoid forgetting someone, I want to collectively thank all the extraordinarily
talented people who were at some point during my PhD part of the joint VU-UvA
labor/human capital work-in-progress group. I enjoyed and benefited greatly from
the animated discussions and the different perspectives brought forward during our
two-hour Friday-afternoon meetings.
I also want to express my gratitude to the doctoral committee - Anne Gielen, Bettina
Siflinger, Jan van Ours, Erik Plug and Maarten Lindeboom - for taking the time to read
and evaluate this dissertation.
Lastly, I need to thank my family who always supported me in my decision to pursue




2 Field of study and family outcomes 5
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Family outcomes by field of study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 The admission lotteries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4 Empirical approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.5 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.7 Returns to medicine by second-best field of study . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.9 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.9.1 Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.9.2 Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3 Household specialization and the child penalty in the Netherlands 47
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2 Institutional background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.3 Data and empirical strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.3.1 Data sources and sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.3.2 Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.3.3 Empirical approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.4.1 Labor market trajectories of individuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.4.2 Labor market trajectories of couples by their relative earnings
potential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.4.3 Use of formal child care . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.6 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.6.1 Long-term child penalties - sample of individuals . . . . . . . . . 76
3.6.2 Long-term child penalties by relative earnings potential . . . . . 77
3.6.3 Event-study analysis for further measures of relative earnings
potential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.6.4 Use of formal child care for further measures of earnings potential 85
4 Do doctors improve the health care of their parents? Evidence from admis-
sion lotteries 87
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.2 Institutional background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.2.1 Health care system in the Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.2.2 The admission lotteries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.2.3 The study program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.3.1 Data sources and sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.3.2 Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.4.1 Association of having a child who is a doctor with parental health
outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.4.2 Causal evidence from admission lotteries . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.6 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.6.1 Additional tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111





Educational levels have increased considerably in the past decades, especially among
women who are now graduating from college at higher rates than men (OECD, 2020e).
Economists have long been concerned with the effects of education on various aspects
of individuals’ lives, such as earnings, fertility and health (e.g. Becker, 1964; Card, 1999;
McCrary and Royer, 2011; Mincer, 1974; Monstad et al., 2008; Oreopoulos and Salvanes,
2011). The level of education is only a crude measure of educational attainment as
fields of education differ in curriculum, skill requirements and labor market prospects.
This has effects beyond pecuniary returns, which the literature has focused on so far
(Altonji et al., 2012, 2016; Kirkebøen et al., 2016). Recent studies now also investigate
outcomes other than earnings returns, such as partner choice and fertility (Kaufmann
et al., 2015; Kirkebøen et al., 2020; Wiswall and Zafar, forthcoming).
Fields of study likely have large and heterogeneous effects on many family outcomes.
Field of study may affect partner choice as the chosen field influences the pool of
potential partners one meets while in education, but also subsequently in one’s social
and professional network. It may act as a signal of ability, social status and/or labor
market potential, which affects individuals’ attractiveness on the marriage market
(Kaufmann et al., 2015). Types of education differ in their career prospects which may
affect individuals’ decision on whether and when to form a family as well as on family
size. The rising college graduation rates among women outdate the traditional male
breadwinner model and redefine the division of labor among couples. The effects of
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educational choices may also transmit across generations. For instance, children’s
educational achievement may be shaped by pecuniary returns to education, but also by
the quality of the chosen partner (e.g. Black and Devereux, 2011; Holmlund et al., 2011).
Individuals’ relatives, e.g. their parents, may also benefit from the skills, knowledge and
network that individuals acquired during their education.
Despite the obvious importance of educational choices on family outcomes, which
may run via multiple potential pathways, not much empirical research has been done
on this topic. The chapters in this dissertation aim to contribute to filling some of
the gaps in the literature on the effects of educational choices on family outcomes.
Chapter 2 studies the causal effects of field of study on family formation and children’s
educational achievement. Chapter 3 investigates how individuals’ educational choices
affect their within-household earnings potential and consequently the division of labor
once children are born. Chapter 4 focuses on the effects of the child being a doctor
on parental health as an indicator for the importance of information limitations for
inequalities in health.
Chapter 2 studies the relationship between field of study and family outcomes. An
extensive literature has shown that the level of education affects not only earnings, but
also important family outcomes such as partner choice and fertility. Much less is known
about the impact of field of study on family outcomes even though college graduation
rates have increased considerably in the past decades (OECD, 2020e).
The chapter uses admission lotteries for oversubscribed university studies in the
Netherlands that took place between 1988 and 1999. The study programs consid-
ered are medicine, dentistry, veterinary medicine and international business, which
had admission lotteries with sufficient numbers of admitted and rejected applicants.
Centrally-executed lotteries fully determined access to these four studies, creating ex-
ogenous variation in who is admitted to the program. Consequently, winners and losers
of the first admission lottery are identical in terms of pre-treatment characteristics,
such as ability, motivation and preferences. Using an instrumental variable approach,
family outcomes of applicants who won the first admission lottery and completed their
preferred field of study are compared with family outcomes of applicants who lost the
first lottery and entered their next-best field.
The results show that winning the lottery and completing the desired study program
has significant effects on individuals’ partner choice (measured by level and field of
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education as well as earnings), (household) earnings and fertility. Moreover, there is
evidence of intergenerational effects on children’s scholastic achievement. The effects
differ by lottery program and by gender indicating that the individual characteristics of
the study program and the labor market they lead to are relevant for later-life outcomes.
Chapter 3 assesses how educational choices themselves and as determinants of
within-household earnings potential affect individuals’ labor market trajectories when
having children. A recent literature shows that first-time parenthood has substantial
and persistent negative effects on women’s labor market outcomes, while there are only
minor negative effects for men (e.g. Kleven et al., 2019a,b). The causes of this so-called
’child penalty’ on women are still less clear. One potential cause brought forward in the
literature is household specialization based on comparative advantage. Men often out-
earn their female partners and may thus have a comparative advantage in labor market
work relative to child rearing and household production, and specialize accordingly. On
average, this would cause a parenthood earnings gap to the disadvantage of women as
is found in the literature. If couples divide labor based on their comparative advantages,
then households where the woman has the higher earnings potential should deviate
from the traditional division of labor. Women with a high relative earnings potential
should concentrate on market work and their partners on home production.
The chapter tests this hypothesis using administrative data for the Netherlands and
an event-study methodology centered around the birth of the first child. The results
first confirm previous studies that document a substantial child penalty on women and
hardly any effects of fatherhood on men’s labor market outcomes. Women’s earnings
loss is primarily driven by their marked reduction in working hours and to a lesser extent
by lower participation and a gradual decline in wage rates. However, child penalties are
heterogeneous with respect to individuals’ level of education and field of study.
Importantly, analyses for various proxies of (relative) earnings potential show no
evidence that households divide market work and child care based on comparative
advantages or bargaining power. Women who have a higher earnings capacity than their
partner face lower earnings losses after childbirth and reduce their labor supply less than
women with a low relative earnings potential. However, men’s labor market trajectories
appear largely unaffected by parenthood irrespective of their relative earnings potential,
which speaks against the importance of household specialization. These patterns seem
instead be driven by differences in absolute earnings potential among women, such
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that higher-educated/higher-earning women remain more attached to the workforce
after having children. Descriptive evidence suggests that they manage to reconcile
career and family by making more use of formal child care.
Chapter 4 uses the admission lotteries to medical school in the Netherlands to study
how health outcomes of parents are affected by having a child who is a doctor. This
will provide insights about the importance of unequal access to medical expertise and
services as a driver of inequalities in health, health care use and access. A large literature
shows that even in the presence of universal health insurance coverage there remains
inequality in access to health care for reasons unrelated to individuals’ health (e.g.
Angerer et al., 2019; Van Doorslaer et al., 2006, 2004). These reasons include information
limitations about health risks, adequate preventive behavior or treatment options.
Doctors’ parents presumably have full access to medical expertise and services via their
children, so that their health care is unaffected by any of these factors.
There are various ways in which parents’ health care use and outcomes may be
affected by having a child who is a doctor. Doctors may provide information about
preventive behavior and health risks. They may also convince their parents to take
prescribed medication and to complete treatments and may be able to recognize symp-
toms at an early stage. Lastly, doctors may use their knowledge and network to obtain
treatment for their parents.
The chapter compares outcomes of the parents whose child won the first admission
lottery to medical school and became a doctor to the outcomes of parents whose
child lost this lottery and did not become a doctor. The health outcomes considered
are mortality, (total) health care costs, different types of health care use and various
hospital diagnoses and medication use. The findings document strong associations
between the child being a doctor and parental health care use, costs and mortality in the
Dutch population. Yet, when controlling for self-selection into the medical profession
exploiting the randomization induced by the admission lotteries, these effects largely
disappear. The estimation results show causal effects on mortality which are close to
zero and statistically insignificant. For health care use and costs most estimates are not
significantly different from zero, though some are too imprecisely estimated to rule out
substantial effects. Overall, the results indicate that having access to medical expertise
and services through a child who is a doctor is not an important cause of differences in
parents’ health care use and mortality.
CHAPTER 2
Field of study and family outcomes1
2.1 Introduction
A recently emerging literature shows that the causal effects of field of study on earnings
are of similar magnitude as the causal effects of the level of education on earnings
(Altonji et al., 2012; Hastings et al., 2013; Ketel et al., 2016, 2019; Kirkebøen et al., 2016).
But while an extensive literature documents that higher levels of education not only
affect earnings but also important family outcomes such as partner choice and fertility2,
much less is known about the impact of field of study on family outcomes. This paper
contributes to filling this gap.
Field of study can influence family outcomes in various ways. First, it may affect
partner choice as the chosen field influences the pool of potential partners at an age at
which many partnerships are formed. There is indeed strong assortative matching by
field of study (Bičáková and Jurajda, 2016; Eika et al., 2019). The chosen field of study
also affects individuals’ attractiveness on the marriage market as it may act as a signal
of ability, social status and/or labor market potential (Kaufmann et al., 2015). Second,
because fields of study differ in the impact they have on career opportunities, they may
influence decisions on whether and when to form a family. Using Scandinavian data,
1This chapter is based on Artmann et al. (2018).
2Examples include: Oreopoulos and Salvanes (2011), Lefgren and McIntyre (2006), Currie and Moretti
(2003), Geruso and Royer (2018), Fort et al. (2016), Monstad et al. (2008), McCrary and Royer (2011) and
Aaronson et al. (2014).
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Hoem et al. (2006) and Lappegård and Rønsen (2005) find that field of study serves
as a better predictor of permanent childlessness and first-birth rates than the level of
education. Third, through their effects on own earnings and partner quality, field of
study may affect the educational achievement of children (e.g. Black and Devereux,
2011; Holmlund et al., 2011). Relatedly, Kaufmann et al. (2015) show that children of
applicants who are admitted to a more elite university program in Chile perform better
on a national standardized test.3
If the chosen field of study has effects beyond labor market outcomes, prospective
students may be aware of this and take these effects into account when making their
field of study choices. Wiswall and Zafar (forthcoming) present evidence that students
at an elite university in the US indeed believe that their choice of major affects the
probability of being married, spousal education and earnings, and fertility. Moreover,
they find that the perceived family returns help explain students’ human capital choices.
Whether differences in family outcomes by field of study are truly causal or are
merely due to self selection, is an open question. While the above mentioned channels
are plausible, it cannot be ruled out that people who are anyhow less inclined to have a
family, opt for a field of study where a higher fraction of people stay single. Also Wiswall
and Zafar’s finding that students perceive that family outcomes depend on the choice
of major, does not prove causality because only the realization for the actually chosen
major is observed.
This paper uses admission lotteries for university studies in the Netherlands to esti-
mate causal effects of field of study on family outcomes. The effects that we estimate are
based on the contrast between family outcomes of applicants who won the admission
lottery and completed their preferred field of study and family outcomes of applicants
who lost the lottery and ended up in their next-best field. The family outcomes that
we consider are: having a partner, quality of the partner (measured as having a partner
with a university degree and having a partner with a university degree from the same
field), own earnings, partner earnings and household earnings, number of children
and quality of children (measured as children entering the highest track in secondary
school). We focus on medicine, dentistry, veterinary medicine and international busi-
3Kaufmann et al. (2015) also study effects on the likelihood of marriage and of having a child, but do
not find any effects. They find positive effects on spouse quality for female, but not male applicants.
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ness studies, which are undergraduate programs that have admission lotteries with
sufficient numbers of admitted and rejected applicants.
The labor markets for which the four programs prepare their students are differently
organized which may affect their impact on partner choice and other family outcomes.
Completing medicine, dentistry and veterinary medicine grants a license that is re-
quired to work in a specific occupation. This is not the case for international business
studies, which shares its work field with economics and regular business administration.
Students who complete medicine often start working in large organizations such as
hospitals, while dentists and vets are mainly self-employed. Dentists, and to a lesser
extent medical doctors, have much higher incomes than veterinary doctors.
The admission lotteries provide an opportunity to estimate the causal effects of
completing a particular field of study. They also allow us to examine some potential
mechanisms that drive the choice of a partner. We can distinguish between the impact
of the field of study on having a partner from the most-preferred field of study, i.e. the
lottery study program, and on having a partner from the same field of study. If partner
choice is mainly determined by who someone meets during her/his study, we should
find a strong causal effect of winning the admission lottery on having a partner from
the most-preferred field of study, but not on having a partner from the same field of
study. This pattern of causal effects also occurs when individuals have preferences for a
partner with the same (realized) study background. On the other hand, if individuals
have a strong preference for partners with the same (pre-lottery) interests then we
should find no causal effects of having a partner from the most-preferred field of study,
but a strong causal effect on having a partner from the same field of study. Losing a
lottery may, however, not change preferences for a partner from that field of study, but
may make someone less attractive to potential partners in that field. Finally, partner
choice may be related to labor market prospects. In that case causal effects should
mainly be present for students in medicine en dentistry, which have the highest returns.
Our results show that losing the lottery significantly reduces the probability to be
with a partner from the most-preferred field of study. This holds for both men and
women in all fields of study. In most cases this effect has about the same size as the
causal effect on having a partner from the same field of study. This suggests that people
have a stronger preference for having a partner from their most-preferred field of study
than having a partner from the same field of study, but that when someone loses the
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admission lottery it becomes more difficult to find a partner from the most-preferred
field of study. For women there are no effects on the likelihood of having a partner and
for men this effect is only significant for medicine and veterinary medicine. Women
who complete the medical studies on average have partners with higher earnings,
this does not hold for men and for women completing international business. Men
who complete medicine have more children than their counterparts. The children of
men who complete medicine and of women who complete veterinary medicine or
international business are more likely to enter the highest track in secondary school
than the children of their counterparts. The finding that fields of study matter for family
outcomes is further strengthened by the result that the effects of winning the lottery for
medicine depend on what the next-best field of study is.4
The analysis based on admission lotteries pertains to four fields of study. To put
these results in perspective, Section 2.2 starts with a descriptive analysis using adminis-
trative data from 16 birth cohorts (1967-1982) of the Dutch population. This analysis
documents considerable differences in family outcomes between fields of study among
university graduates for all fields of study. Probabilities to have a partner vary by more
than 10 percentage points between different fields and the degree of assortative match-
ing by field of study is high. Graduates from different fields of study have partners with
on average rather different earnings and fertility and educational outcomes of their
children differ substantially between graduates from different fields of study. After this
descriptive section, Section 2.3 provides details about the admission lotteries, Section
2.4 introduces the empirical approach and Section 2.5 describes the data. Section 2.6
presents the estimates of the causal effects of fields of study on family outcomes. Section
2.7 presents results that differentiate the effects of completing medicine by next-best
fields. Section 2.8 summarizes and concludes.
2.2 Family outcomes by field of study
This section presents descriptive results of family outcomes by field of study. It first
shows high rates of assortative matching by field of study. Next, it documents substantial
differences between graduates from different fields of study in own earnings, partner
4Medicine is the only field with admission lotteries with enough observations to analyze this.
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earnings and household earnings, as well as in fertility and the educational achievement
of their children.
Data and setting
The results in this section are based on administrative data from Statistics Nether-
lands (CBS) which contain information from municipalities, tax authorities, education
registries and social insurance administrations of all inhabitants of the Netherlands.
We distinguish between 11 fields of study at the university level: 1) Education,
2) Humanities, including Arts and Journalism, 3) Social sciences, 4) Economics, 5)
Business, 6) Law, 7) Science, including Mathematics and Informatics, 8) Engineering,
including Manufacturing and Construction, 9) Agriculture, including Veterinary, 10)
Health, and 11) Services.5 Students in the Netherlands choose their field of study when
they enter university, around age 18. We focus on the cohort born between 1967 and
1982 (4.3 million individuals) and measure outcomes at age 35. At this age, earnings
provide a good proxy of life-cycle earnings and most family formation has taken place.6
Like in many other countries, enrollment in university education in the Netherlands
increased substantially over time, from about 9.4% of men and 7.8% of women born
in 1967 to approximately 12.8% of men and 14.7% of women in the 1982 birth cohort.
For both men and women there are only minor differences in distributions of fields of
study between cohorts. When looking at differences between fields we therefore pool
all cohorts.7 Gender differences in choice of field of study are substantial (see Figure 5
in the Appendix), and similar to observed differences in most OECD countries (OECD,
2016). Business and Engineering are popular fields among men and Social sciences and
Humanities are often chosen by women.
Partner choice and earnings
The probability to have a partner (married or cohabiting) at age 35 is higher for male
university graduates than for other men (79.6% vs. 74.7%), while there is only a minor
5In an earlier version of this paper we distinguished between at least college and less than college
(see Artmann et al. (2018)). This does not change our findings.
6Although fertility is not completed at age 35, potential differences in the timing and number of
children by field should be visible at that age.
7See Figure 5 in the Appendix for the distributions of fields of study among university graduates by
gender for the birth cohorts 1967-1972, 1973-1977 and 1978-1982.
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difference for women (81.2% vs. 81.9%). About 5.7% of men and 5.3% of women are
in a partnership where both partners are university-educated. This fraction is more
than four times as large as what would result under random matching.8 There are also
differences by field of study. While more than 84% of graduates in Health and female
graduates in Agriculture and Veterinary have a partner at age 35, just around 73% of
male graduates in Humanities and Social Sciences do.9
When we focus on couples where both partners completed university, we find that
around 28.2% of men and women are in a partnership where both partners have a
degree from the same field of study. This is a much larger share than the less than 10%
that would result under random matching.10
To compare assortative matching between fields we use the measure proposed by
Liu and Lu (2006) which takes differences in marginal distributions into account.11
Figure 1 shows these corrected shares of assortative matching by field of study and
gender. For men, the corrected shares are highest in Engineering and for women in
Health, while for both genders they are lowest in Services, Business and Education.
Individual earnings differ substantially by level of education and gender. At age 35,
men with a university degree earn on average 60,300 euros per year and men without a
university degree 35,800 euros.12 For women these amounts are 41,000 and 18,600 euros.
When looking at household earnings, the gender differences largely disappear. Women’s
8To calculate the share of men in a partnership where both partners are university educated under
random matching, we multiply the share of university-educated men in their birth cohort with the share
of women with a university degree in the birth cohort of the men’s actual partner. Taking the mean
of the resulting probabilities gives men’s likelihood under random matching of both partners having a
university degree. The shares for women are computed analogously.
9Figure 6 in the Appendix shows the probability to have a partner/be married/be divorced by gender
for all fields of study. Partners also include same-sex partners. Marriage rates are roughly 30 percentage
points lower than partnership rates. Divorce rates are low at age 35, only 4.6% (2.6%) for women (men).
10Figure 7 in the Appendix shows for each field of study the actual and random shares with a partner
from the same field of study by gender. The random matching draws from the cohort of the current
partner. For all fields, the observed share of graduates with a partner from the same field is considerably
higher than the share that would be expected under random matching.
11While the sex that is in the minority in a given field can in principle achieve an assortative matching
rate of 100%, the maximum attainable rate for members of the sex that is the majority in a given field is
bounded by the "supply" of the other sex. Liu and Lu (2006) divide the difference between the actual
share and the share under random matching by the difference between the maximum attainable share
and the share under random matching.
12Annual earnings are measured as the sum of before-tax income from employment, income from
self-employment, income from abroad, and other income from labor and are converted to 2015 euros.
Household earnings are calculated including single households.
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households earn slightly more than the respective households of men with the same
level of education, i.e. household earnings are 88,800 vs. 85,500 for university-educated
and 53,600 vs. 50,000 euros for non-university educated women and men. This pattern
is likely to reflect the high degree of assortative matching documented and women’s
tendency to "marry up" in terms of education, age and income (Bertrand et al., 2015).
The top panel of Figure 2 shows that individual earnings are much higher for gradu-
ates from some fields (Economics, Health, Business, Law) than for graduates from other
fields (Education, Humanities). In each field, individual earnings are higher for men
than for women. The middle panel shows that partner’s earnings follow the same pat-
tern by field and the reverse pattern by gender: women who studied Economics or Law
match with partners who earn substantially more than the partners of women in Edu-
cation. The bottom panel combines the two graphs (together with partner formation)
and shows that the differences in household income between graduates from different
fields are inflated, whereas the differences between men and women disappear.13 The
fact that the differences between fields are inflated is a likely consequence of the high
degree of assortative matching by field of study.
13The fact that in most fields household earnings are higher for women than for men reflects that
women typically form a partnership with men that are somewhat older.
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Figure 2: Average individual (top panel), partner (middle panel), and household (bottom












































































2.2. Family outcomes by field of study 13
Intergenerational effects
Figure 3 shows the average number of children at age 35 by field of study and gender.
Women of all fields have on average more children at age 35 than men from the same
field.14 Female graduates in Education and Health and male graduates in Health have
the most children, while graduates in Humanities, the field with the lowest average
(household) earnings, have the fewest. The average number of children tends to be
higher in fields where a larger fraction of the graduates have a partner.
























To examine the educational success of the children of graduates from different fields
of study, we focus on children that are of secondary-school age and measure which
share of them entered the highest academic track.15 Slightly more than 20% of each
cohort from the general population enters this track. Figure 4 shows that this share is
higher among the children of parents with a university degree. It also shows that there
is substantial variation across fields. About 35% of the children of men who studied
Services enter the highest track, while this share is about 55% among the children of
female graduates in Economics or Engineering.
14The differences by field of study in average number of children at age 40 of the birth cohorts 1967 to
1975 show a qualitatively similar picture.
15Dutch schoolchildren are tracked into different levels at age 12 when they enter secondary school.
The pre-university track is the highest academic track.
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Figure 4: Fraction of secondary-school children that entered the highest academic track


























2.3 The admission lotteries
The previous section documented large differences in family outcomes by field of study.
Whether these differences reflect causal effects of fields of study or are merely due to
selection, is unclear. To examine this, we now turn to fields of study that have used
admission lotteries.
Secondary-school graduates in the Netherlands who complete the pre-university
track are eligible for university studies in all fields of study and institutions. For the large
majority of fields, universities have to accept all applicants but some fields have quotas
that limit the number of students that are admitted. The quotas were introduced in
response to the drastically increasing number of potential students at the end of the
1960s which exceeded the number of available places (see Goudappel (1999) for details
on the reasons for introducing quotas).
Until 1999, students who applied to a study program with a quota were admitted on
the basis of the results from a (nationwide) centralized lottery.16 We focus on medicine,
16From 2000 onwards, studies with quotas have been allowed to admit (initially) at most 50 percent
of the students using their own criteria. Universities have made increasing use of this and by now,
the admission lotteries have been completely abandoned. Selection is often based on motivation and
previous experience. For this reason we restrict our analysis to students who first applied to a lottery
study before this change.
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dentistry, veterinary medicine and international business, which are the study pro-
grams that were substantially oversubscribed for multiple years. The latter is important
because rejected applicants are allowed to reapply in the next year. We observe that a
substantial fraction of rejected first-time applicants reapply at least once.
Lottery participants are assigned to lottery categories.17 Those with a higher GPA
on their high-school exams have a higher chance of being admitted, i.e. they receive a
higher weight in the lottery (see Table 1).18 Applicants in lottery category A with a GPA
of at least 8.5 receive a weight of 2.00, whereas applicants with a GPA between 6 and
6.5 are assigned to category F with a weight of 0.67. The last category "Other" includes
applicants who did not take the Dutch secondary school exams, e.g. foreign students,
and will be excluded from the analysis. The majority of students are in categories D
to F. The number of available places per category is determined such that for the total
number of available places divided by the number of applicants in a category, the
weights given in Table 1 hold.
Table 1: Lottery categories
Category GPA Weight
Share
Medicine Dentistry Vet. medicine Int. business
A 8.5 ≤ GPA ≤ 10 2.00 1.7% 0.3% 1.0% 0.7%
B 8.0 ≤ GPA < 8.5 1.50 5.4% 1.9% 2.8% 2.9%
C 7.5 ≤ GPA < 8.0 1.25 8.6% 3.4% 6.4% 6.4%
D 7.0 ≤ GPA < 7.5 1.00 20.8% 13.8% 18.7% 19.2%
E 6.5 ≤ GPA < 7.0 0.80 22.1% 21.4% 24.7% 24.4%
F 6.0 ≤ GPA < 6.5 0.67 29.9% 39.8% 33.3% 36.1%
Other – 1.00 11.5% 19.5% 13.2% 10.4%
Note: GPA is grade point average on the final exams in high school. Share is the share of applicants in the
different categories that applied for the lotteries in the years 1988 to 1999. Weight indicates the relative
probability of being admitted. The category "Other" refers to students who did not participate in the
nationwide high school exams, such as foreign students. This category will be excluded from the analysis.
17Applicants are allowed to submit a list of their up to three most preferred universities, but their
choice has no influence on the outcome of the admission lottery. After the result of the lottery is known,
admitted students are divided over the universities taking account of their preferences as far as possible.
18Graduating from secondary school requires an exam in seven subjects including Dutch and English.
Applicants for medicine, dentistry and veterinary medicine should also have passed biology, chemistry,
physics and math. Once the exam is passed it cannot be retaken.
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Comparison of lottery participants with general university population
In most years between 1988 and 1999, the lottery participants in our sample account for
about 8 to 11% of all first-year university students. For the field of health, the number of
lottery participants in medicine and dentistry equals on average 117% of all first-year
university students in this field.19
To assess whether our sample of lottery participants is similar to the general uni-
versity population, Table 2 compares the two groups in terms of family background.
In terms of numbers of siblings, parents living together and urbanicity there are no
large differences between the lottery sample and the general population. Participants
in the lotteries for medical school, dentistry and veterinary medicine come from more
affluent families than the typical university student (in their field). This is not the case
for participants in the lotteries for international business, who seem to come from
average families with children graduating from university.20 Hence, while we cannot
claim that the lottery sample is representative for the general university population, it
does not seem to be a very exceptional group.
19Note that this does not reflect the actual distribution of medicine and dentistry students within the
field of health as not all lottery participants actually enroll in that field. The lottery participants (including
those we drop from our sample, see Section 2.5) enrolling in medicine or dentistry account for about 48%
of first-year university students studying a health-related program between 1988 and 1999.
20The share of students for whom the parents are both unknown is larger in the general university
population than in the lottery sample. This is due to the restriction for inclusion in the lottery sample of
having participated in the Dutch high-school exams.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































18 2. Field of study and family outcomes
2.4 Empirical approach
We are interested in the effects of completing a study with an admission lottery on
family outcomes. As in Section 2.2, we focus on outcomes measured at age 35. We
assume a linear relationship between outcome variable Yi t of individual i observed at
age 35 in year t , and degree completion (Ci ):
Yi t =αt +δCi +Xiβ+LCi +Ui t (2.1)
The effects of degree completion on outcomes are captured by δ, our parameter of
interest. The vector of controls Xi includes individual’s age at first lottery participation
and an indicator for non-western origin.21 The interaction term between lottery cate-
gory and year of first participation, LCi , controls for the fact that individuals’ chances
of being admitted are only identical conditional on fixed effects for lottery year times
category. Lastly, αt are fixed effects for the year in which the respective outcome is
observed and Ui t is an individual-specific error term.
Compliance with the result of the first lottery is imperfect for all four study programs
(see Section 2.5). Not all winners of the first lottery enroll in the respective program,
while some drop out before completing their degree. The fraction of lottery losers
who (successfully) reapply in subsequent years differs by program, but ultimately a
substantial fraction of first-time lottery losers completes the lottery study program. As
degree completion Ci is endogenous, a simple OLS estimate of δ would be biased, so
that we use an instrumental variable approach. The result of an individual’s first lottery
(LR1i ) serves as an instrument for degree completion (Ci ):
Ci = κt +λLR1i +Xiθ+LCi +Vi t (2.2)
The identifying assumption is that conditional on Xi and LCi , the result of the first
lottery is mean independent of Ui t : E [Ui t |Xi ,LCi ,LR1i ] = E [Ui t |Xi ,LCi ]. Since program
admission is random conditional on lottery category times year of first participation,
the mean conditional independence assumption holds for the first lottery where se-
lective reapplication has not taken place yet. The parameter λ describes the fraction
21When analyzing the effect of completing a specific lottery study program on children’s educational
achievement we also include the child’s gender, child’s age at secondary-school enrollment and fixed
effects for the year of enrollment in Xi .
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of compliers in the sample, so that δ in equation (2.1) is to be interpreted as Local
Average Treatment Effect (LATE). This describes the effect of graduating for individuals
for whom the result of the first lottery determines whether they complete the respective
study program.
2.5 Data
Data sources and sample
We use administrative data from different registers available at Statistics Netherlands.
The register on the admission lotteries contains information on all applicants for
medicine, dentistry, veterinary medicine, and international business, their lottery cate-
gory and the outcomes of all lotteries. We merge this with information on actual study
choices of all applicants and their study progress.
Lottery information is available for the years 1987 to 2004. To make sure that we
observe first-time applicants, we exclude applicants who participated in 1987 since we
have no information about possible participation in 1986, and we exclude applicants
older than 20 when we observe them applying for the first time. Because the lottery
system was gradually abandoned after 1999, we also exclude individuals applying for
the first time after that year.22
Summary statistics
The lotteries ensure that characteristics of winners and losers of their first lottery are
well balanced. This is confirmed by the results from balancing tests reported in Tables
13 to 16 in the Appendix for each of the four study programs. Table 3 reports summary
statistics on study enrollment and completion separately by gender and result of the
first lottery for the four study programs. Around 93% of the applicants admitted to
medicine, dentistry and veterinary medicine in their first lottery actually enroll in the
program, while these rates are slightly lower for international business. Among the
losers of the first lottery, between 11% and 43% of men and 10% to 48% of women enroll
in the respective program after having won a subsequent lottery. Almost all lottery
22We also drop applicants from lottery category A and applicants for dentistry in 1988 to 1992 and for
international business in 1993, 1994 and 1999 because for these groups admission probabilities are close
to one.
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winners enroll in a study program in the Netherlands, while between 90% and 98% of
the losers do so. The shares of lottery winners who complete the program are lowest for
international business (55% of men and 60% of women) and highest for medicine (81%
of men and 84% of women). Between 88% and 98% of lottery winners and between 83%
and 97% of lottery losers complete a study program in the Netherlands.
Table 3: Sample description by gender and result of the first lottery application
Men Women
Winners Losers Winners Losers
I. Medicine
Enrolled in medicine 94.6% 42.9% 93.6% 48.2%
Completion of medicine 81.3% 37.4% 83.9% 44.6%
Enrolled in study program in NL 99.6% 96.5% 99.6% 97.4%
Completion of study program in NL 95.6% 90.6% 98.1% 95.5%
N 4872 5697 6854 7970
II. Dentistry
Enrolled in dentistry 91.5% 39.7% 91.7% 42.3%
Completion of dentistry 76.9% 34.1% 81.1% 38.8%
Enrolled in study program in NL 99.5% 96.5% 99.5% 98.7%
Completion of study program in NL 96.8% 92.6% 98.6% 96.8%
N 437 511 444 529
III. Veterinary medicine
Enrolled in veterinary medicine 93.7% 24.9% 93.7% 32.0%
Completion of veterinary medicine 76.8% 22.4% 83.8% 28.2%
Enrolled in study program in NL 98.9% 90.6% 99.4% 93.3%
Completion of study program in NL 94.3% 83.1% 97.9% 88.7%
N 349 960 678 1922
IV. International business
Enrolled in international business 86.9% 11.5% 83.3% 10.1%
Completion of international business 54.5% 6.4% 60.0% 6.2%
Enrolled in study program in NL 99.1% 98.6% 99.4% 97.6%
Completion of study program in NL 88.6% 86.3% 93.8% 90.4%
N 3001 2492 1396 1091
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Table 4 shows for each of the lottery studies the five fields of study that are most
often chosen by male and female lottery losers who end up in their next-best study.
Many losers enroll in programs that belong to the same educational field as the lottery
study program they applied for.
Table 5 presents summary statistics for the outcome variables by program, gender
and admission status. Between 41% and 56% of the lottery applicants have a partner
with a university degree at age 35, whereby this fraction is higher among lottery winners
than among losers. The winners of all four lottery study programs more frequently
have a partner who obtained his/her university degree in the same ISCED-classified
educational field. Admitted first-time applicants also more often have a partner who
graduated from the respective lottery study program. Average annual real earnings
at age 35 are higher for lottery winners than for lottery losers. The partners of male
lottery losers often earn more than those of male lottery winners, while the reverse holds
for female lottery applicants. Overall, the households of lottery winners have higher
average incomes than the households of lottery losers, with the exception of women
applying for veterinary medicine.23 The fraction of medicine, dentistry, veterinary
medicine and international business applicants’ children who enroll in the highest track
of Dutch secondary education also partly differs between lottery winners and losers.
2.6 Results
This section first shows that the result of the first lottery is decisive for the study choice
of 37% to 54% of the applicants. It then shows that field of study affects partner choice.
Doctors, male veterinarians and female international business graduates are more likely
to have a partner (with a university degree) than the respective applicants who were not
admitted. Winning applicants from all fields are more likely to have a partner from the
same field of study than losing applicants, and female doctors and female veterinarians
have partners who on average earn more than the partners of applicants that lost the
lottery for these fields. Finally, this section shows that field of study influences the
number of children and the likelihood that children perform well in school.
23The lottery applicants’ and their partners’ earnings do not add up to the respective average household
income as the latter also includes single households.
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Table 4: Most popular study fields of lottery losers enrolling in other programs
Men Women
I. Medicine
Health 23.0% Health 31.2%
Science, Mathematics, Informatics 19.5% Social sciences 16.6%
Business 13.6% Science, Mathematics, Informatics 13.8%
Engineering, Manufacturing, Construction 9.9% Business 8.3%
Law 9.2% Education 7.9%
II. Dentistry
Health 27.6% Health 34.7%
Business 19.8% Science, Mathematics, Informatics 12.0%
Engineering, Manufacturing, Construction 13.8% Law 10.7%
Science, Mathematics, Informatics 11.6% Business 10.4%
Law 7.2% Social sciences 8.5%
III. Veterinary medicine
Agriculture, Veterinary 23.2% Science, Mathematics, Informatics 21.3%
Science, Mathematics, Informatics 22.0% Health 19.7%
Health 12.2% Agriculture, Veterinary 18.9%
Engineering, Manufacturing, Construction 12.2% Education 7.8%
Business 9.3% Social sciences 7.1%
IV. International business
Economics 34.7% Business 33.0%
Business 32.9% Economics 26.1%
Law 10.1% Law 14.0%
Social sciences 4.1% Social sciences 7.5%
Engineering, Manufacturing, Construction 3.2% Humanities, Arts, Journalism 5.7%
First-stage results
The first-stage regressions show the effects of winning the first lottery on the probability
of completing the respective lottery study program. As displayed in the first lines of each
panel in Table 6, the first-stage estimates are all highly significant and the F-statistic is
always sufficiently large. Winning the first lottery increases the probability to complete
medicine by 41 percentage points for men and by 37 percentage points for women,
while the probability to complete dentistry rises by 43 percentage points for men and
women. Winning the first lottery raises the likelihood to complete veterinary medicine
by 49 percentage points for men and by 54 percentage points for women, whereas male
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Table 5: Summary statistics on family outcomes by applicants’ admission status and
gender
Men Women
Winners Losers Winners Losers
I. Medicine
Partner at age 35 84.2% 81.7% 83.8% 84.4%
Partner university degree 54.9% 52.3% 55.7% 54.0%
Partner same university field 28.4% 21.4% 21.3% 17.1%
Partner medical degree 23.0% 14.8% 17.7% 11.1%
Number of children at age 35 1.24 1.10 1.42 1.39
Real (2015) earnings 82,775 69,890 63,526 52,758
Real (2015) earnings partner 37,878 39,002 72,212 68,154
Real (2015) household earnings 114,335 101,192 123,527 109,431
Child enrolled in highest track 54.5% 51.0% 56.5% 56.0%
II. Dentistry
Partner at age 35 85.5% 83.3% 86.2% 88.1%
Partner university degree 53.7% 52.4% 54.5% 54.8%
Partner same university field 28.5% 20.2% 24.4% 22.2%
Partner dentistry degree 17.9% 10.9% 18.0% 10.4%
Number of children at age 35 1.22 1.11 1.53 1.44
Real (2015) earnings 116,020 90,103 80,062 62,557
Real (2015) earnings partner 41,977 41,810 77,164 74,918
Real (2015) household earnings 151,719 124,035 146,230 127,790
Child enrolled in highest track 47.8% 51.6% 55.3% 47.9%
III. Veterinary medicine
Partner at age 35 85.0% 81.0% 78.9% 81.5%
Partner university degree 50.9% 45.3% 41.9% 41.5%
Partner same university field 27.5% 15.5% 16.2% 12.8%
Partner veterinary medicine degree 24.2% 9.3% 12.9% 4.5%
Number of children at age 35 1.15 1.02 1.16 1.16
Real (2015) earnings 64,524 59,763 36,816 39,200
Real (2015) earnings partner 31,995 33,360 60,203 57,151
Real (2015) household earnings 91,477 86,381 84,019 85,260
Child enrolled in highest track 53.6% 48.3% 49.6% 47.0%
IV. International business
Partner at age 35 81.2% 82.5% 84.0% 82.7%
Partner university degree 42.6% 40.6% 55.1% 53.3%
Partner same university field 10.0% 8.7% 19.0% 18.4%
Partner international business degree 5.0% 1.9% 11.4% 3.9%
Number of children at age 35 0.95 0.97 1.18 1.20
Real (2015) earnings 75,277 73,297 52,945 50,017
Real (2015) earnings partner 35,899 36,185 78,542 77,768
Real (2015) household earnings 103,915 102,540 118,241 113,339
Child enrolled in highest track 49.5% 50.4% 58.3% 54.2%
Note: We have weighted observations by the inverse probability of winning the lottery for each lottery
category/lottery year combination to allow for a causal interpretation of the differences between the
columns.
and female winners of the first lottery are 47 and 53 percentage points, respectively,
more likely to complete international business.
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The second lines in each panel in Table 6 show that redefining the treatment variable
as enrollment instead of completion increases the first-stage estimates somewhat, from
0.44 for women participating in the lottery for medicine to 0.74 for men participating in
the lottery for international business studies. This means that IV estimates of effects of
enrollment are 16% to 37% smaller than IV estimates of effects of completion. To keep
results comparable with the descriptives from Section 2.2 and because completion is a
clearer treatment than enrollment, we will present IV results in terms of the effects of
completion.
Effects on partnership formation and partner choice
The first rows in each panel of Table 7 report IV estimates of the effect of completion of
a lottery study on the probability of having a partner. Men who completed medicine
or veterinary medicine are 7 and 9 percentage points more likely to have a partner at
age 35, respectively, than men who lost the lottery and ended up in their next-best
study. It seems that the prestige of their job makes male doctors and veterinarians more
attractive on the marriage market, while we find no such effect for females. There is
also no effect for applicants of the other lottery studies.24
The next rows report the effects of completing lottery studies on the probabilities
to have a partner with a certain level or type of education. We analyze whether an
applicant’s partner has 1) a university degree, 2) a university degree from the same
broad field of study as the applicant25 and 3) a degree from the same lottery study
program as the applicant. All effects are measured unconditional on having a partner.
First, we find positive effects of degree completion on the probability to have a
partner with a university degree for male and female doctors and for female interna-
tional business graduates. Though marginally insignificant, the effect is largest in terms
of magnitude for veterinary medicine. This is likely due to the fact that male lottery
losers are somewhat more likely to not study at all or to study at a university of applied
24Table 17 in the Appendix reports the effects on the probability to be married (including registered
partnership but not cohabitation) at age 35. We find significant positive (negative) effects for male doctors
and dentists (female veterinarians), but none for the remaining graduates. There are only small negative
(positive) effects on the probability to be divorced by age 35 for female graduates of international business
(veterinary medicine).
25For the latter outcome we again use the ISCED-classification and sort fields of study into the same
eleven mutually exclusive categories as in our descriptive analysis in Section 2.2.
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Table 6: First-stage estimates
Men Women
λ̂ s.e. F λ̂ s.e. F
I. Medicine
Completion 0.41*** (0.01) 2013.1 0.37*** (0.01) 2363.1
Enrollment 0.50*** (0.01) 3813.4 0.44*** (0.01) 3991.7
II. Dentistry
Completion 0.43*** (0.03) 189.0 0.43*** (0.03) 193.2
Enrollment 0.53*** (0.03) 362.4 0.50*** (0.03) 307.3
III. Veterinary medicine
Completion 0.49*** (0.03) 333.5 0.54*** (0.02) 733.8
Enrollment 0.66*** (0.03) 668.0 0.60*** (0.02) 961.4
IV. International Business
Completion 0.47*** (0.01) 1585.6 0.53*** (0.02) 913.2
Enrollment 0.74*** (0.01) 5669.2 0.71*** (0.02) 2197.8
Notes: All specifications include controls for ethnicity, age at the first lottery application, lottery category,
year of first lottery and interaction terms of the year of first lottery and lottery category.
Levels of statistical significance: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
sciences compared to lottery losers of the other programs. Lottery winners therefore
have comparatively more opportunities to meet potential partners with a degree from a
research university.
Second, there is a strong positive impact on the likelihood to have a partner who
completed a university study in the same ISCED-classified field as the applicant, which
for the lottery losers means having a partner educated in their second-best field ("Part-
ner same field (uncorrected)"). When we account for the applicant’s gender being in the
minority or majority in the field and for the different sizes of fields (following the trans-
formation proposed by Liu and Lu (2006)), the magnitude (and sometimes significance)
of the estimates changes ("Partner same field (corrected)"). From the perspective of the
prospective student who chooses a field of study, the uncorrected measure is probably
the more relevant one as this is informative about the probability to have a partner who
graduated university from the same field of study. The uncorrected measure does not
distinguish whether this is due to the sex ratio in the field, the size of the field or the
strength of (corrected) assortative matching in the field.
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Table 7: Instrumental variables estimates of the effects of degree completion on part-
nership formation and partner choice
Men Women
δ̂ s.e. δ̂ s.e.
I. Medicine
Partner 0.07*** (0.02) −0.02 (0.02)
Partner university degree 0.07*** (0.03) 0.05** (0.03)
Partner same field (uncorrected) 0.18*** (0.02) 0.12*** (0.02)
Partner same field (corrected) 0.13*** (0.03) 0.30*** (0.04)
Partner medical degree 0.21*** (0.02) 0.19*** (0.02)
II. Dentistry
Partner 0.06 (0.06) −0.04 (0.06)
Partner university degree 0.05 (0.08) −0.02 (0.09)
Partner same field (uncorrected) 0.19*** (0.07) 0.04 (0.07)
Partner same field (corrected) 0.13 (0.10) 0.10 (0.15)
Partner dentistry degree 0.16*** (0.06) 0.17*** (0.06)
III. Veterinary medicine
Partner 0.09* (0.05) −0.04 (0.04)
Partner university degree 0.12 (0.07) 0.03 (0.05)
Partner same field (uncorrected) 0.26*** (0.06) 0.08** (0.04)
Partner same field (corrected) 0.34*** (0.09) 0.13*** (0.05)
Partner veterinary medicine degree 0.31*** (0.05) 0.18*** (0.03)
IV. International Business
Partner −0.02 (0.02) 0.04 (0.03)
Partner university degree 0.05 (0.03) 0.08* (0.04)
Partner same field (uncorrected) 0.03 (0.02) 0.10*** (0.03)
Partner same field (corrected) −0.05 (0.04) 0.02 (0.04)
Partner international business degree 0.07*** (0.01) 0.14*** (0.02)
Notes: All specifications include controls for ethnicity, age at the first lottery application, lottery category,
year of first lottery, interaction terms of the year of first lottery and lottery category, and dummy variables
for the year when the outcome is observed. "Partner same field" is a dummy variable rescaled using the
transformation proposed by Liu and Lu (2006).
Levels of statistical significance: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Third, both male and female lottery winners are more likely to be in a partnership
with someone who obtained a degree in the same lottery study program compared
with non-admitted applicants. The effects tend to be larger than those we found for
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having a partner from the same field as lottery winners are more likely to meet (more)
graduates from the lottery study program than the losers. The estimates are largest for
veterinarians and doctors and somewhat smaller, but still substantial for dentists. The
effects are smallest for international business, the program that is most similar to lottery
losers’ commonly chosen alternative study programs. We tend to find larger effects
for the sex that is in the minority in the respective study program, while the effects are
relatively similar for the gender-balanced field of dentistry.
The results indicate strong effects on assortative matching based on field of ed-
ucation and study program. The results are in line with Eika et al. (2019) who find
substantial rates of assortative matching by college major in Norway. The graduates of
our four lottery programs search to a larger extent for a partner within the social network
of their study program or their profession than the lottery losers, which might be due
to their preferences, meeting opportunities or labor market prospects. University and
the workplace play a more important role as a marriage market for them than for the
lottery losers in their second-best fields. The estimated effects might thereby be largest
for medicine and veterinary medicine as the labor markets for these graduates likely
bring about social and professional networks that are more homogeneous in terms of
educational field than the networks of other college graduates.
Earnings returns
We now turn to estimates of the effect of completing a lottery study on the annual
earnings of the applicants themselves, of their partners (conditional on having a partner)
and their households. We focus on earnings at age 35, which is 15 to 17 years after their
first lottery participation.26
For applicants’ annual earnings, we estimate substantial returns to completing
medicine for both male and female doctors (Table 8). The returns to a dentistry de-
gree are even larger amounting to more thanAC 62,000 for men and almostAC 40,000 for
women. Completing international business or veterinary medicine does not signifi-
cantly increase earnings for men. Female international business graduates earn almost
AC 5,000 more than the lottery losers, while female veterinary medicine graduates earn
almostAC 5,000 less than the lottery losers.
26The effects on earnings of applicants for medicine and dentistry for up to 22 years after the first
lottery are explored in detail in Ketel et al. (2016) and Ketel et al. (2019).
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Table 8: Instrumental variables estimates of the effects of degree completion on annual
individual, partner and household earnings
Men Women
δ̂ s.e. δ̂ s.e.
I. Medicine
Earnings 33,050*** (2938) 29,138*** (1879)
Partner earnings -2940* (1787) 12,040*** (3547)
Household earnings 33,993*** (3471) 39,037*** (3766)
II. Dentistry
Earnings 62,286*** (10,931) 39,660*** (8148)
Partner earnings 537 (6568) 3972 (10,958)
Household earnings 66,805*** (12,888) 40,698*** (13,364)
III. Veterinary medicine
Earnings 7547 (6242) -4889** (2454)
Partner earnings -2995 (4029) 7578* (4096)
Household earnings 7963 (7739) -1319 (4715)
IV. International Business
Earnings 1,407 (3856) 4731* (2844)
Partner earnings -1540 (1963) -547 (5715)
Household earnings -421 (4506) 7638 (6174)
Notes: All specifications include controls for ethnicity, age at the first lottery application, lottery category,
year of first lottery, interaction terms of the year of first lottery and lottery category, and dummy variables
for the year when the outcome is observed.
Levels of statistical significance: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
The earnings differences between partners of male doctors and non-doctors are
negative, while female doctors have partners who earn significantly more than the
partners of female non-doctors. This is likely in part due to the high degree of assortative
matching that we found above as many female doctors have a partner with a medical
degree. While we also found a high rate of assortative matching for male doctors, the
negative earnings estimate for their partners might suggest that they are more likely to
work fewer hours or stay at home - potentially even if they are a doctor themselves. This
seems to be confirmed by the fact that the partners of male doctors are on average five
percentage points more likely to have no income in the year the applicant is aged 35
compared to lottery losers’ partners. Female dentists also more often have a partner
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who works as dentist, but the earnings differences relative to partners of non-admitted
applicants for dentistry are imprecisely estimated and not statistically different from
zero. While the partners of male veterinarians earn insignificantly less than the partners
of lottery losers, the partners of female veterinarians earn about 7,600 euros more
per year than their counterparts. Completing international business does not lead to
earnings returns in the form of higher partner income.
Finally, we estimate the effects of degree completion on household earnings when
the applicants are aged 35. The household earnings27 returns are qualitatively similar
to the individual returns. Both male and female doctors’ households reap substantial
returns to completing medicine, but the returns are now considerably larger for women
which may again be driven by their higher propensity to be in a partnership with another
doctor. The returns for dentists are higher than those for doctors amounting to almost
AC 67,000 per year for men and AC 41,000 for women. The negative returns for female
veterinarians and the positive returns for their partners roughly offset each other, so
that there are no significant differences in household earnings relative to lottery losers.
There are no significant household earnings returns for male veterinarians and for
international business graduates.
Effects on fertility
Table 9 reports estimates of the effects of degree completion on the total number of
children at age 35. Male doctors have on average more children at that age than male
non-doctors. This effect could be driven by their higher probability to have a partner
at that age, their higher earnings and/or their partner’s somewhat lower labor force
participation. For female doctors we do not find significant differences in the average
number of children. The gender differences for doctors may reflect the greater difficulty
of women to combine family and work in comparison to their male colleagues. For
graduates from the other three programs, there are no significant differences in fertility
in comparison to non-admitted applicants. For male dentists and male veterinarians
the point estimates are, however, quite similar to those of male doctors.28 While there
27Household earnings are computed as the sum of individual and partner earnings, but amount to
individual earnings if the lottery applicant does not have a partner.
28Table 18 in the Appendix shows the effects on the probability to have at least one child by age 35.
There are again only positive effects for male doctors, but none for the remaining graduates.
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may be a positive earnings effect for male doctors on their number of children, such an
effect does not seem to exist for dentists (or only to a lower degree) even though their
earnings returns are markedly higher. Graduates’ preferences for children and family
life seem to play a more important role in their fertility decisions than their earnings.
Table 9: Instrumental variables estimates of the effects of degree completion on the
number of children
Men Women
δ̂ s.e. δ̂ s.e.
I. Medicine 0.36*** (0.06) 0.06 (0.05)
II. Dentistry 0.23 (0.17) 0.21 (0.18)
III. Veterinary medicine 0.21 (0.16) 0.01 (0.10)
IV. International Business −0.06 (0.07) 0.002 (0.09)
Notes: All specifications include controls for ethnicity, age at the first lottery application, lottery category,
year of first lottery, interaction terms of the year of first lottery and lottery category, and dummy variables
for the year when the outcome is observed.
Levels of statistical significance: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Intergenerational effects
Finally, we report the estimates of the effect of completing medicine, dentistry, veteri-
nary medicine or international business on the probability that the applicants’ children
enroll in the highest track of secondary education. In the Netherlands, primary school
education comprises eight years and begins when children are four years old. After that,
they are tracked into one of three secondary education tracks: pre-vocational education,
senior general secondary education and pre-university education. Selection is based
on teacher recommendations and on national standardized exams that students take in
the final year of primary school, i.e. at age 11/12. On average, about 20% of all students
are admitted to the pre-university track.
To assess the selectivity into the estimation samples of children that we use below,
we first estimate the effect of degree completion on the probability of having at least one
child who is at an age where students typically enter secondary school, both conditional
and unconditional on having children (Table 19 in the appendix). Unconditional on
having children, there are no significant differences between female lottery winners
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and losers, while male doctors, dentists and veterinarians are more likely to have a
child who is at an age of having entered secondary education. Conditional on having
children, female dentists and veterinarians are also more likely to have a child at an age
of having entered secondary education. In line with the insignificant effects on fertility
outcomes of international business graduates, there is no indication of selectivity into
the sample of children for this program.
Children of male doctors are 7.7 percentage points more likely to enroll in the pre-
university track than children of non-admitted applicants (Table 10). There are no
differences in enrollment rates for children of female medicine lottery applicants or
of dentistry applicants. The effects on children of applicants for veterinary medicine
and international business studies are insignificant when the father was the applicant
and significantly positive when the mother was the applicant. For male medicine and
female international business graduates we found a 7 and 8 percentage point higher
probability to have a partner with a university degree, respectively, which might partly
explain the positive effects on children’s school performance here. The effect size of
around 9 percentage points is large relative to the baseline enrollment rates in the
academic track of around 50%.
Table 10: Instrumental variables estimates of the effects of degree completion on chil-
dren’s academic enrollment
Men Women
δ̂ s.e. N δ̂ s.e. N
I. Medicine 0.077** (0.031) 5887 −0.003 (0.026) 9739
II. Dentistry −0.031 (0.161) 277 −0.029 (0.118) 313
III. Veterinary medicine 0.039 (0.077) 723 0.091* (0.053) 1289
IV. International business −0.025 (0.027) 5640 0.098*** (0.035) 2957
Notes: All specifications include controls for ethnicity, age at the first lottery application, lottery category,
year of first lottery, interaction terms of the year of first lottery and lottery category, child’s gender, child’s
age of enrollment in secondary education, and dummy variables for year of secondary school enrollment.
Levels of statistical significance: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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2.7 Returns to medicine by second-best field of study
The counterfactual to completing each of the lottery fields is the second-best field which
the lottery losers chose. As Table 4 shows, the second-best fields are diverse, which
makes it likely that the effects vary by second-best field. In this section, we take a closer
look at the effects of completing medicine in comparison to several second-best fields
of study.29 This provides additional insights into how these alternative fields are related
to the family outcomes we consider.
The pairwise comparison of studies would be straightforward if the second-best
field of study of each applicant was known. Since this is not the case for applicants who
won the lottery and enroll in medicine, we use a procedure along the lines of Imbens
and Rubin (1997).
We first divide all applicants into cells k based on their lottery category, lottery
year and gender. Separately for each of the resulting 95 cells30, we run IV-regressions
of the outcome variables on the exogenous regressors (age at first application, non-
western origin) and on the completion dummy using the result of the first lottery as
instrument. For each cell, we store both the coefficient of the completion indicator
(δ̂k ) and the variance of this estimate (σ̂
2
k ). Subsequently, we group the lottery losers’
university degrees into four broad fields: 1) Health, 2) Social sciences (excl. Economics),
Education, Humanities, Arts, Services (henceforth Social Sciences), 3) Business, Law
and Economics (BALawEcon), and 4) Science, Mathematics, Informatics, Engineering,
Manufacturing, Construction, Agriculture and Veterinary (STEM).
We slightly adapt the procedure that was developed by Imbens and Rubin (1997)
to estimate outcome distributions of compliers in IV models and use it to estimate
the fraction of compliers studying each of the four second-best fields we defined. We
cannot identify compliers directly from the data, but can identify winning never takers
(i.e. LRi 1 = 1 and Ci = 0), and losing never takers and compliers combined (i.e. LRi 1 = 0
and Ci = 0). For both groups we observe their distribution of second-best study choices.
We also know the population shares φa , φn and φc of always takers, never takers and
29We focus on medicine as this is the only field with a sufficient number of observations to perform
this analysis.
30We consider 4 lottery categories (C-F), 12 lottery years (1988-1999) and men and women separately,
so that we obtain 96 cells (4x12x2). Since one cell does not contain any lottery losers, we exclude it and
end up with 95 cells.
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compliers, respectively. With that information, we can estimate the distribution of
second-best study choices SC of the losing compliers in our data set, i.e. the fraction of
compliers in the four second-best fields in each cell:
Pc (SC |LRi 1 = 0,Ci = 0) = φc +φn
φc
f (SC |LRi 1 = 0,Ci = 0) −
φn
φc
f (SC |LRi 1 = 1,Ci = 0)
(2.3)
Due to the randomization caused by the lottery, the distribution of losing compliers’
second-best study choices is identical to the distribution of fields that winning compliers
would have chosen. Keeping only one observation per cell k, we lastly regress the
IV coefficients obtained above (δ̂k ) on the four variables indicating the fractions of
compliers in the four second-best fields (ρHeal thc , ρ






obtained in equation (2.3), on lottery category (Lcat), lottery year (Lyear) and a gender
dummy.31 Thereby, we use the precision (i.e. the inverse of the variance σ̂2k ) of the IV
regression estimates as weights:
δ̂k = βHeal th ρHeal thc +βSoci al Sci ences ρSoci al Sci encesc +βB ALawEcon ρB ALawEconc
+βST E M ρST E Mc +Lcatk +Lyeark +δ f emal e +Uk
(2.4)
Table 11 reports results from this procedure for the probability to have a partner at
age 35 and for partner characteristics. Each of the estimates can be interpreted as the
effect for a specific complier group, for instance: the compliers who would have studied
STEM if losing the first lottery for medicine.32
Although the coefficient estimates vary considerably by second-best field, hardly
any of the effects are statistically significant. They do reveal some interesting patterns
though. First, the coefficients suggest that doctors whose second-best field is STEM
are less likely to have a partner than losing compliers, whereas doctors whose second-
best field is Health, Social Sciences or BALawEcon are more likely to have a partner
than losing compliers. Second, the effects on the probability to have a partner with a
31Contrary to the previous analyses, we do not split the sample by gender as it would further reduce
the power of the regression model.
32Differences in the estimates within a column should not be understood as differences in causal
effects between for example medicine vs. Social Sciences and medicine vs. STEM. The reason is that
applicants with different second-best fields are likely to have different potential outcomes, as doctor but
also in each of the alternative fields.
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university degree are positive for Health, Social Sciences and STEM, but negative for
BALawEcon. Third, completing medicine increases the probability to have a partner
from the same field relative to graduates in Health, Social Sciences and STEM, while it
decreases it relative to graduates in BALawEcon. Lastly, doctors are considerably more
likely to have a partner with a medical degree than graduates in other health-related
study programs. The effects in comparison to the remaining three fields are insignificant
and of lower magnitude.
Table 11: Differences in partner choice at age 35 of medicine graduates by second-best
field of study
Partner Partner Partner
Partner university degree same field medical degree
Health 0.072 0.111 0.097 0.357***
(0.138) (0.187) (0.170) (0.153)
Social Sciences 0.027 0.010 0.044 0.174
(0.146) (0.163) (0.192) (0.172)
BALawEcon 0.077 −0.292 −0.100 0.033
(0.183) (0.254) (0.233) (0.208)
STEM −0.023 0.042 0.152 0.189
(0.111) (0.156) (0.146) (0.129)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of statistical significance: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
The differences in earnings and fertility at age 35 by second-best field are provided in
Table 12. The earnings returns to medicine are highest for graduates whose alternative
choice is another health-related program or in the broad field of Social Sciences. The re-
turns to completing medicine in comparison to BALawEcon and STEM are considerably
lower and not statistically significant. Partner’s earnings are lower in comparison to all
fields, but these differences are always insignificant. Household earnings differences
follow a similar pattern as individual earnings differences, albeit only the returns relative
to Health differ significantly from zero at the 10% level. The estimated differences in the
number of children at age 35 are always positive, but are too imprecisely estimated to be
of statistical significance. Nonetheless, the results suggest that the largest differences in
fertility can be found between doctors and graduates in other health-related programs,
Business, Law and Economics.
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Overall the pattern arises that we find most effects for doctors whose second-best
alternative is Health or Social Sciences, while the effects for doctors with a STEM field or
BALawEcon as their second-best are all insignificant. A suggestive explanation for this
is that both STEM and BALawEcon are more similar to medicine in terms of marriage
market attractiveness (ability, social status and/or labor market potential) than Health
(excluding medicine) and Social Sciences, a mechanism brought forward by Kaufmann
et al. (2015).
Table 12: Differences in earnings and fertility outcomes at age 35 of medicine graduates
by second-best field of study
Partner Household Number of
Earnings earnings earnings children
Health 57,149*** -21,209 53,413* 0.652
(20,233) (15,821) (28,972) (0.405)
Social Sciences 60,885*** -16,584 52,794 0.149
(19,969) (20,267) (31,921) (0.433)
BALawEcon 31,455 -24,041 6191 0.473
(25,103) (21,443) (38,267) (0.539)
STEM 16,157 -1395 16,775 0.121
(16,012) (13,240) (23,716) (0.337)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of statistical significance: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
2.8 Conclusion
This paper documents that family outcomes of university graduates differ substantially
by their field of study. To deal with the self-selection of students into fields of study, we
exploit admission lotteries for four substantially oversubscribed study programs. Our
results show that lottery winners are more likely to have a partner from the lottery field
than lottery losers. We interpret this as evidence that search frictions play a role on the
marriage market. However, the lottery winners are also more likely to find a partner
in their broad field of study than the lottery losers. This indicates that search frictions
are not the only explanation, but that also preferences are important for explaining
assortative matching on the marriage market. Our analysis does not allow to quantify
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the importance of the different channels, which would require to also consider that
losing a lottery may make someone less attractive for desired partners.
The channels through which fields of study influence labor market outcomes and
fertility are probably even more complex. Own earnings are likely to influence and to
be influenced by partner earnings, and both potentially influence and are influenced
by fertility decisions. Children’s educational outcomes may be directly influenced by
own and partner’s field of study, but most likely also by labor market outcomes, parents’
ages at birth and the presence of siblings.
While pinning down the exact channels through which field of study affects family
outcomes is complicated, studies like ours show that not only labor market outcomes,
but also important other dimensions of a person’s life are causally influenced by field of
study. This concurs with the expectations of the students in the work of Wiswall and
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Figure 6: Probability to have a partner (top panel), be married (middle panel) and be
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2.9.2 Tables
Table 13: Balancing of individual characteristics by outcome of the first medicine lottery
application
Lottery winners Lottery losers p-value
Lottery category B
Female 60.1% 61.1% 0.67
Age at first application 18.0 17.9 0.64
Non-Western immigrant 5.0% 4.1% 0.60
N 1805
Lottery category C
Female 62.2% 63.0% 0.43
Age at first application 18.0 18.0 0.18
Non-Western immigrant 4.2% 4.0% 0.50
N 2721
Lottery category D
Female 59.0% 59.5% 0.71
Age at first application 18.2 18.2 0.91
Non-Western immigrant 5.5% 5.5% 0.68
N 6069
Lottery category E
Female 57.4% 58.8% 0.25
Age at first application 18.4 18.3 0.71
Non-Western immigrant 7.7% 7.5% 0.31
N 6414
Lottery category F
Female 56.0% 56.2% 0.77
Age at first application 18.6 18.5 0.02
Non-Western immigrant 10.7% 10.4% 0.32
N 8384
Notes: The p-values in the final column are weighted by the admittance probabilities for students in
different years of lottery application.
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Table 14: Balancing of individual characteristics by outcome of the first dentistry lottery
application
Lottery winners Lottery losers p-value
Lottery categories B & C
Female 59.0% 55.6% 0.60
Age at first application 18.1 17.9 0.18
Non-Western immigrant 7.0% 6.7% 0.59
N 162
Lottery category D
Female 56.5% 54.9% 0.62
Age at first application 18.2 18.2 0.38
Non-Western immigrant 8.4% 7.2% 0.53
N 344
Lottery category E
Female 50.0% 49.0% 0.71
Age at first application 18.5 18.5 0.10
Non-Western immigrant 8.1% 6.6% 0.28
N 522
Lottery category F
Female 44.2% 50.4% 0.12
Age at first application 18.8 18.7 0.23
Non-Western immigrant 9.1% 12.1% 0.12
N 893
Notes: The p-values in the final column are weighted by the admittance probabilities for students in
different years of lottery application.
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Table 15: Balancing of individual characteristics by outcome of the first veterinary
medicine lottery application
Lottery winners Lottery losers p-value
Lottery category B
Female 69.9% 71.2% 0.91
Age at first application 17.9 17.8 0.27
N 139
Lottery category C
Female 65.8% 67.4% 0.77
Age at first application 18.1 18.0 0.09
N 307
Lottery category D
Female 61.8% 70.2% 0.03
Age at first application 18.2 18.3 0.08
Non-Western immigrant 1.2% 1.4% 0.98
N 839
Lottery category E
Female 69.4% 64.9% 0.16
Age at first application 18.5 18.4 0.49
Non-Western immigrant 3.7% 1.9% 0.08
N 1116
Lottery category F
Female 65.6% 65.9% 0.66
Age at first application 18.7 18.7 0.79
Non-Western immigrant 3.4% 1.8% 0.12
N 1508
Notes: The p-values in the final column are weighted by the admittance probabilities for students in
different years of lottery application. In compliance with the data privacy regulations of Statistics
Netherlands, we do not report the fractions of non-western immigrants in categories B and C as they are
too small.
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Table 16: Balancing of individual characteristics by outcome of the first international
business lottery application
Lottery winners Lottery losers p-value
Lottery categories B & C
Female 37.7% 37.3% 0.61
Age at first application 18.1 18.1 0.50
Non-Western immigrant 4.4% 2.5% 0.16
N 860
Lottery category D
Female 32.9% 34.0% 0.70
Age at first application 18.3 18.4 0.22
Non-Western immigrant 3.7% 2.6% 0.74
N 1765
Lottery category E
Female 31.5% 28.9% 0.20
Age at first application 18.6 18.6 0.60
Non-Western immigrant 5.6% 3.3% 0.02
N 2183
Lottery category F
Female 28.4% 29.3% 0.58
Age at first application 18.7 18.7 0.55
Non-Western immigrant 6.1% 5.3% 0.60
N 3172
Notes: The p-values in the final column are weighted by the admittance probabilities for students in
different years of lottery application.
44 2. Field of study and family outcomes
Table 17: Instrumental variables estimates of the effects of degree completion on marital
status
Men Women
δ̂ s.e. δ̂ s.e.
I. Medicine
Married 0.13*** (0.03) 0.002 (0.02)
Divorced 0.01 (0.01) −0.0002 (0.01)
II. Dentistry
Married 0.15* (0.08) −0.04 (0.08)
Divorced 0.02 (0.02) 0.004 (0.02)
III. Veterinary medicine
Married 0.03 (0.07) −0.10** (0.04)
Divorced 0.003 (0.02) 0.03* (0.01)
IV. International Business
Married 0.03 (0.03) −0.01 (0.04)
Divorced −0.02 (0.01) −0.03* (0.01)
Notes: All specifications include controls for ethnicity, age at the first lottery application, lottery category,
year of first lottery, interaction terms of the year of first lottery and lottery category, and dummy variables
for the year when the outcome is observed.
Levels of statistical significance: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 18: Instrumental variables estimates of the effects of degree completion on the
probability to have a first child
Men Women
δ̂ s.e. δ̂ s.e.
I. Medicine 0.13*** (0.03) 0.03 (0.02)
II. Dentistry 0.11 (0.08) 0.02 (0.07)
III. Veterinary medicine 0.11 (0.07) −0.01 (0.04)
IV. International Business −0.004 (0.03) 0.01 (0.04)
Notes: All specifications include controls for ethnicity, age at the first lottery application, lottery category,
year of first lottery, interaction terms of the year of first lottery and lottery category, and dummy variables
for the year when the outcome is observed.
Levels of statistical significance: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 19: Instrumental variables estimates of the effects of degree completion on sample
selectivity
Men Women
δ̂ s.e. δ̂ s.e.
I. Medicine
Unconditional on having children 0.111*** (0.021) 0.028 (0.020)
Conditional on having children 0.092*** (0.023) 0.0002 (0.021)
II. Dentistry
Unconditional on having children 0.186*** (0.062) 0.098 (0.062)
Conditional on having children 0.208*** (0.075) 0.135* (0.073)
III. Veterinary medicine
Unconditional on having children 0.102* (0.059) 0.008 (0.037)
Conditional on having children 0.125* (0.068) 0.079** (0.040)
IV. International business
Unconditional on having children −0.029 (0.031) 0.014 (0.039)
Conditional on having children 0.008 (0.027) −0.003 (0.030)
Notes: All specifications include controls for ethnicity, age at the first lottery application, lottery category,
year of first lottery, and interaction terms of the year of first lottery and lottery category.
Levels of statistical significance: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

CHAPTER 3
Household specialization and the
child penalty in the Netherlands33
3.1 Introduction
A recent literature shows that first-time parenthood has substantial and persistent
negative effects on women’s labor market outcomes, while it has only minor negative
effects for men (Bütikofer et al., 2018; Chung et al., 2017; Kleven et al., 2019a,b; Sieppi
and Pehkonen, 2019).34 Inspired by Becker (1985) it has been hypothesized that house-
hold specialization based on comparative advantage is an important channel for this
so-called child penalty for women.35 The evidence regarding this channel is, however,
mixed. Angelov et al. (2016), Pora and Wilner (2019) and Chung et al. (2017) find support
for it36, while Andresen and Nix (2019), Kleven et al. (forthcoming) and Rosenbaum
(2019) do not.
33This chapter is joint work with Hessel Oosterbeek and Bas van der Klaauw.
34These papers conduct event studies centered around the birth of the first child to estimate the effect
of parenthood on labor market outcomes of mothers compared to fathers. A different approach is used
by Lundborg et al. (2017) who exploit IVF-treatments in Sweden to obtain exogenous variation in fertility
among childless women to estimate the causal effect of having children on their career. Their findings
concur with the results of the papers that use an event-study design.
35Other mechanisms discussed in the literature are biology, preferences and gender norms (cf. An-
dresen and Nix, 2019).
36Angelov et al. (2016) find that the magnitude of the within-couple earnings gap depends on the
relative earnings within the family. Relating the child penalty to women’s pre-childbirth rank in the
distribution of hourly wages, Pora and Wilner (2019) conclude that child penalties arise from decisions
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A possible reason for the mixed evidence is that the importance of the household
specialization channel varies across settings due to differences in relevant institutions
regarding for example the possibilities to adjust working hours or to use formal child
care for very young children. In this paper, we investigate the importance of household
specialization in a setting – the Netherlands – where there are arguably no institutional
hurdles to divide household tasks in a gender-neutral way. In the Netherlands, em-
ployees are legally entitled to unilaterally change the working hours of their already
existing contract. This is one of the reasons why not only the share of part-time working
women is very high, but also the fraction of men working less than 30 hours per week
is with 19.4% in 2019 by far the highest among all OECD countries (OECD, 2020d). It
is therefore easier and presumably more accepted for fathers to trade market work for
child care if their partner has better earnings prospects. Furthermore, formal child care
is available for children as young as three months so that parents have the option to use
it when paid maternity leave ends (Plantenga and Remery, 2009).
Using the event-study approach proposed by Kleven et al. (2019a), we first replicate
results from other countries; there are large and persistent negative effects of first
parenthood on women’s earnings, while there is no effect on men’s earnings. The
earnings child penalty is about 47% ten years after women have their first child. This is
mostly due to a reduction in working hours right after childbirth and to a lesser degree
to lower participation and a gradual decrease in wage rates. Conducting the analysis
by parents’ level of education, we find a similar earnings child penalty for college and
non-college educated women though its drivers differ. We also find substantial, but
heterogeneous child penalties for all fields of study, whereby the child penalty is lowest
in the male-dominated fields of Science and Mathematics, and Informatics.
To study whether couples divide household and market work based on comparative
advantages and bargaining power, we construct various measures of mothers’ and
fathers’ earnings potential. The measures differ in how sophisticated they assume
households to be. Using different measures of relative earnings potential will give
more insights into the factors that couples take into account when bargaining over
childcare and market work. While all our proxies for relative earnings potential measure
based on specialization gains rather than on preferences or gender norms. Chung et al. (2017) find that
the within-couple earnings gap increases more for couples where the male spouse has a higher education
than the female partner.
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different aspects of earnings capacity, overall we find little evidence of household
specialization based on comparative advantages. Women with higher within-household
earnings capacity reduce their labor supply less than women with lower relative earnings
potential, but men only marginally adjust their labor supply after childbirth irrespective
of their relative earnings potential. We therefore conclude that even in a setting that is
conducive for young parents to divide household tasks in a gender-neutral way, spouses
do not specialize according to their comparative advantage. Descriptive evidence
instead suggests that the use of formal child care is more sensitive to women’s earnings
potential implying that higher-earning/higher-educated women pay for more child
care to reconcile work and family.
Apart from the recent literature on the child penalty, our paper relates to the litera-
ture on the effects of first-time parenthood on women’s labor supply and earnings more
generally (see e.g. Adda et al., 2017; Bertrand et al., 2010; Hotz et al., 2017; Lundberg
and Rose, 2000; Lundborg et al., 2017; Paull, 2008; Waldfogel, 1998; Wilde et al., 2010).
Our paper also relates to the vast literature on gender inequality in the labor market
with recent reviews by Blau and Kahn (2017) and Olivetti and Petrongolo (2016). This
literature among others finds that traditional human capital variables contribute little to
the gender gap in recent years, but that gender differences in occupation and industry,
career interruptions, shorter working hours and the unequal gender division of labor
continue to play important roles.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief
overview of the institutional background in the Netherlands. Section 3.3 describes our
data and empirical approach. Section 3.4 discusses our proxies for earnings potential
and presents our findings, and section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Institutional background
Female labor force participation expanded considerably later in the Netherlands than
in other OECD countries. For most of the 1980s, women’s employment rate was around
30%, while it was, for instance, above 70% in Sweden (OECD, 1989). This changed in the
1990s when the female employment rate increased rapidly to 63.5% in 2000. With 74%
in 2019, it is now among the highest of all OECD countries (OECD, 2020b). However,
many women in employment work on a part-time basis. While working reduced hours
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was already very common in the 1990s, access to part-time work was further facilitated
by the Adjustment of Working Hours Act (Wet Aanpassing Arbeidsduur, WAA) that came
into force in June 2000. This law mandated that under certain conditions employees are
entitled to a change in the working hours of their already existing contract (Wilthagen
et al., 2004). In 2019, about 56.9% of women worked less than 30 hours a week, while
the average in the OECD is 25.4%. Among men, this fraction is with 19.4% about twice
as high as the OECD average of 9.6%, making it the highest part-time working rate of
men among all OECD countries. During the period we observe labor market outcomes
(1999-2018), between 55.4% and 61.1% of women and between 11.9% and 19.2% of men
were working less than 30 hours per week (OECD, 2020d).
The Dutch social security and pension system insures individuals against income
losses in case of divorce, end of a registered partnership or death of one partner. If
one spouse or registered partner dies, the other is entitled to a survivor’s pension
(Rijksoverheid, 2020a). Unless explicitly agreed otherwise in the divorce/separation
settlement, both spouses are entitled to an equal share of any pension built up during
the marriage/registered partnership (pension equalisation, ’pensioenverevening’). If
the ex-partner dies before reaching the pensionable age, the other partner may also be
entitled to a survivor’s pension (’nabestaandenpensioen’). Further, parents are obliged
to pay child maintenance until the child turns 21 in case of a divorce or separation
(Rijksoverheid, 2020b). These rights and obligations apply equally to men and women.
Fertility rates decreased considerably in the 1960s and 1970s before leveling off at
around 1.6 children per woman. In the 2000s, fertility rose again to about 1.7 to 1.8
children per woman during our observation period (first births between 2004 and 2013),
though subsequently dropped again to 1.6 in 2018. Women’s average age when having
their first child increased gradually from 28 years in 1992 to 30 years in 2018 (Eurostat,
2020).
During our observation period, parents were initially subject to the 2001 Work
and Care Act regarding leave regulations (Plantenga and Remery, 2009). It stipulated
women’s entitlement to 16 weeks of paid maternity leave, with four to six weeks taken
before the expected birth of the child and the remainder thereafter. Fathers were
entitled to two days of paid paternity leave (’kraamverlof’), which had to be taken
within four weeks after the birth of the baby. The Act also included the right to primarily
unpaid parental leave for a maximum of 13 times the contractual weekly working hours
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taken on a part-time (50%) basis until the child turns eight. This right is granted to
both mothers and fathers and is not transferable. The law was designed to enable
the reconciliation of (part-time) work and family and to foster a more gender-equal
division of paid and unpaid work (Plantenga and Remery, 2009). It required financial
compensation for parental leave only for public-sector employees, while other workers
had to negotiate compensation in their collective agreements. Consequently, only a
minority of employed parents obtained 13 weeks of paid parental leave (Knijn and
Saraceno, 2010). In January 2009, the parental leave period was extended from 13 to 26
weeks on a half-time basis (Plantenga and Remery, 2009).
Formal child care has been expanded substantially since the late 1990s with the
goal to foster the reconciliation of market and family work, while potential educational
benefits of child care have not been the focus (Knijn and Saraceno, 2010). It is also
available for very young children so that parents can make use of it when paid maternity
leave ends (Plantenga and Remery, 2009). The costs for child care are shared by the
government, employers and parents, whereby the individual contributions of the three
parties have changed over time. Under certain conditions, for instance if both partners
are working, parents are entitled to income-dependent child care subsidies. However,
even with subsidies, costs for child care can be high. Since the 2005 Dutch Act on Child
Care, part of the child care costs can be deducted from income tax. Since 1 January
2007, employers are mandated to pay one sixth of the costs for child care per parent
(Knijn and Saraceno, 2010). Most children attend child care facilities only part of the
week as the vast majority of mothers works part-time. Children typically enter primary
school at age four, though the first year of school is not mandatory. In 2008, primary
schools have been mandated to either offer full-day childcare or to offer facilities for
out-of-school care for children aged four to twelve (Knijn and Saraceno, 2010).
3.3 Data and empirical strategy
This section describes the data used in the empirical analysis, provides summary statis-
tics of the data and explains our empirical approach.
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3.3.1 Data sources and sample
We use administrative data from different registers available at Statistics Netherlands
(CBS). We use the registers on spouses/registered partners and on cohabiting partners
to link couples, and the register that links children to their parents to identify first-time
births. Information on individuals’ level and field of education is drawn from the records
on educational attainment. Our data on labor market outcomes comprises annual
working hours for the employed population (2006-2018), earnings from employment
(1999-2018), earnings from self-employment (1999-2018), income from abroad (2001-
2018) and income from other sources of labor (2001-2018). Total annual income is
computed as the sum of before-tax income from these four sources and is converted to
2015 euros. We infer wage rates as annual income from employment divided by annual
working hours.
Earnings are top-coded at 200,000 euro, annual hours at the legal limit of 2496 hours
(48 hours per week) and wage rates are top-coded at 1000 euro. We also bottom-code
negative income from self-employment at -200,000 euro and drop observations with
imputed wage rates lower than 2 euro. Our indicator for labor force participation is set
to 1 if an individual’s total annual earnings are at least 50% of the amount that a couple
would receive in welfare benefits. The welfare benefit level for couples is set at 100%
of the net minimum wage. The gross minimum wage amounted to 1501.80 euro per
month at the beginning of 2015, which in net is about 1300 euro although this depends
on personal circumstances. Participation thus equals one if annual earnings amount
to at least 7800 (650×12) euro in 2015. Since the minimum wage is roughly raised with
the inflation rate (twice per year), we will inflation-adjust this amount to determine the
minimum earnings threshold for the years 1999 to 2014 and 2016 to 2018.37
We also use data on the use of formal child care that is eligible for subsidies by
the government (2007-2018). It comprises information on parents’ annual costs for
child care as well as the number of hours that a child spent in formal care in a year.
Households that did not qualify for child care subsidies, e.g. because one of the partners
was not working in a year, are not included in the data set. Costs and hours of child care
37We obtain quantitatively similar results if we do not re-code earnings and working hours. If we do
not impose a minimum earnings threshold for the participation indicator, then the post-birth drop in
women’s participation rate and the long-term child penalty are smaller.
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are set to zero for these households. We will not use the available information on child
care subsidies as the latter are income dependent.
Our sample of individuals comprises mothers and fathers who had their first child
between 2004 and 2013 and were observed in the CBS registry in the year before the
birth of their first child. We further restrict the analysis to men and women who were
between 24 and 44 years old when having their first child to exclude most individuals
who gave birth while still in education. The lower bound eliminates about 11.9% of
mothers and 4.3% of fathers, while the upper bound eliminates about 0.1% of mothers
and 2% of fathers. We do not impose restrictions on the relationship status of the
parents in our separate analysis of mothers and fathers. This means we also include a
parent if the other parent is unknown in the CBS-registry. We use an unbalanced sample
of individuals to obtain estimates for five years before and 10 years after having a child.
For our analysis of households, we additionally impose that both parents were aged
24 to 44 when having their first child and that both were observed in the CBS registry
in the year prior to childbirth. We also require that the parents were married and/or
cohabiting in the year when their first child is born and that the first joint child of the
parents is also the first child for both partners individually.
3.3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 20 shows summary statistics for our full sample of more than 700,000 mothers and
fathers and for the more than 600,000 women and men in our household sample. Men
are about two years older than women when their first child is born. Women are more
likely to have a college degree than men, albeit information on highest educational
attainment is missing for about 22.3% of women and 28.5% of men. This fraction is
higher for men as they tend to be older than their female partners and the coverage
of educational attainment in the CBS registries declines with age.38 The fraction of
college graduates is slightly larger in the household sample and labor market outcomes
in the year before birth are also slightly more favorable for the latter group. Women earn
more than 10,000 euros less than men in the year before birth. Average working hours
are almost 300 hours lower among women compared to men and hourly wages for
38CBS’s coverage of college graduation records is also more comprehensive than that of other levels of
education, so that a large part of the individuals with missing education information likely has no college
degree.
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women are also considerably lower than male wages. Female labor force participation
falls about 4 percentage points short of male participation prior to birth. We observe
individuals on average for 14.2 out of a maximum of 16 years.
Table 20: Descriptive statistics by gender for the full and household sample
Full sample Households
Women Men Women Men
Age at first birth 30.5 32.3 30.3 32.6
College degree 41.8% 34.9% 43.6% 38.5%
No college degree 35.9% 36.6% 33.9% 33.0%
Education unknown 22.3% 28.5% 22.5% 28.5%
Earnings in year before birth 29,427 39,619 30,268 41,826
Working hours in year before birth 1533 1805 1583 1866
Participation rate in year before birth 88.2% 92.4% 90.7% 94.7%
Wage rate in year before birth 19.2 22.1 19.2 22.7
Average number of years in data 14.2 14.2 14.2 14.3
N 714,329 724,949 601,644 601,644
Figure 8 depicts the development of average earnings, participation, working hours
and wage rates over our 16-year observation period for the full sample and separately
for college and non-college educated individuals by gender. Even though women’s
earnings are lower than men’s in each (sub-)sample, they initially develop in parallel
before diverging slightly in the year before birth. In the year of and one year after
birth, women’s earnings drop sharply and rise only slightly thereafter. There is no trend
break around parenthood noticeable for men’s earnings. Participation rates increase
before birth, but women’s participation decreases considerably after childbirth without
recovery, while men’s participation rates decline only marginally over time. A similar
picture arises for working hours. In contrast, women’s wage rates drop only slightly after
childbirth and mostly seem to flatten off thereafter, whereas men continue on their
pre-birth growth trajectories.
Table 21 presents descriptive statistics for the 601,644 households in our sample.
About 26% of couples consist of two college graduates, while in 17% of households
neither partner has a tertiary degree. In 9.7% of partnerships only the mother has a
college degree and in 7.2% of households only the father. Educational information for
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at least one partner is missing for almost 40% of our household sample. Average annual
household earnings in the year before the first childbirth amount to about 72,000 euros,
while total household working hours in employment average to 3226.
Table 21: Descriptive statistics on households as entities
Both college degree 26.2%
Both no college degree 17.0%
Only mother college degree 9.7%
Only father college degree 7.2%
Education of at least one partner unknown 39.9%
Household earnings in year before birth 72,094
Household working hours in year before birth 3226
N 601,644
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Almost 73% of households use any formal child care that qualifies for government
subsidies at some point between the year the first child is born and the year the child
turns four. Average annual costs for formal care in that period amount to 4306 euro for
an annual average of 711 hours spent in care. These figures include the use of child care
for all children.
3.3.3 Empirical approach
To analyze the labor market effects of having the first child, we adopt the event-study
methodology proposed by Kleven et al. (2019a,b). We construct an unbalanced panel of
men and women and observe their labor market outcomes up to five years before and
up to ten years after the birth of the first child. As the impact of parenthood differs by
gender, we run this specification separately for men and women (g = m, w):














t +U gi tτ (3.1)
Outcome variables Y gi tτ denote labor market outcomes (earnings, participation, working
hours or wage rate) of individual i of gender g in year t and at event time τ. We measure
all outcomes Y in levels, rather than in log, to keep zeros due to non-participation in the
data set. The top-coding of outcome variables as described in section 3.3.1 mitigates
the influence of extreme outliers on our results. Event times τ refer to the year relative
to childbirth, with Dτ being indicator variables equal to one if the year of observation is
(-5, ..., -2, 0, ..., 10) relative to the year of childbirth. We center the regressions around
event time τ=−1, so that our parameters of interest δgτ measure the effect of having
the first child relative to the last year before childbirth. Age dummies Agi tτ control
nonparametrically for underlying life-cycle trends, while γgt are year dummies that
control nonparametrically for time trends such as business cycles. Identification of
these three sets of dummies is possible because there is enough variation in the timing
of first child birth driven by variation in the age at which individuals enter parenthood.39
Restricting the sample to individuals with children also eliminates any potential bias
from selection into parenthood. We are thus not estimating gender differences in
39We do not include individual fixed effects as then not all sets of fixed effects in the model would be
separately identified causing issues of multicollinearity.
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the labor market effects of parenthood compared to not having children, but gender
differences in labor market outcomes for those who have children.
With the estimates for the event-time coefficients δ̂gτ from equation 3.1, we compute
the impact of children on men’s and women’s labor market outcomes in percentage
terms. For that purpose, we calculate the year-τ effects of parenthood as a percentage





E [Ỹ gi tτ|τ]
(3.2)
The counterfactual Ỹ gi tτ is the predicted outcome when omitting the contribution of the
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(3.3)
The child penalty gives the percentage by which women are falling behind men at
event time τ due to parenthood. Since we are not restricting our sample to having
only one child during our observation period, this measure will also include the effect
of children born after the first one. We conduct this analysis for our full sample, by
level of education (college vs. no college), by field of study and by various measures of
within-household relative earnings potential explained in section 3.4.2 and in Appendix
3.6.3.
As common in event-studies, the identification of effects relies on the assumption
that unobserved variables which determine labor market outcomes change smoothly
over time. It also requires parallel trends, such that e.g. women (men) who had their
first child in 2004 and women (men) who had their first child in 2013 would have had
the same average annual changes in labor market outcomes in the absence of children.
Further, trends for the outcome variables need to be parallel for men and women in the
pre-treatment period in order to compare the effects for men and women and calculate
long-run child penalties (Bütikofer et al., 2018).
Another important identifying assumption of the above methodology is the absence
of anticipation effects, i.e. individuals’ decision to have their first child is independent
of expectations about future labor market developments. Yet, it is, for instance, con-
ceivable that couples decide to have a child because the man was promised to receive
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a promotion in the future or because the woman was able to secure a move to a more
family-friendly job in advance. We would then wrongly attribute the changes in labor
market outcomes to parenthood, while they would have occurred even in the absence
of children, thus violating the assumption of exogenous timing of parenthood (Albrecht
et al., 2018; Angelov et al., 2016). In addition, individuals endogenously select into levels
and fields of education, but also partnerships, based on ability, preferences for e.g. child
care and career, workforce attachment, etc. We therefore interpret our estimates as
correlational evidence instead of as causal effects.
An additional concern with this event-study approach is that with five years the
pre-birth window is relatively short and comprises years where earnings tend to be
unstable. The average age at first childbirth in our sample is around 30 years, so that the
pre-birth observation period mostly covers individuals’ mid- to late-twenties. At these
ages, annual earnings are not a good approximation to lifetime earnings as transitory
income shocks confound the measurement of permanent earnings (Haider and Solon,
2006; Nilsen et al., 2012). Yet, these earnings are used in the event-study approach to
estimate counterfactual earnings trajectories and to calculate child penalties. If the
age-dummies do not sufficiently control for these life-cycle trends, then the event-time
dummies do not correctly capture the post-birth labor market adjustments of men and
women.
3.4 Results
This section first shows the labor market trajectories around childbirth of our full sam-
ple of individuals as well as heterogeneity by level of education and field of study. It then
describes our measures of relative earnings potential and presents findings indicating
that households do not specialize based on comparative advantage. While men barely
reduce their labor supply after childbirth irrespective of their relative earnings capac-
ity, women with high relative earnings potential reduce their labor supply and hence
earnings less than women with low within-household earnings potential. Finally, this
section shows that a household’s use of formal child care is more sensitive to women’s
earnings potential suggesting that high-earning women buy more child care to reconcile
market work and family duties instead of relying on their partner.
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3.4.1 Labor market trajectories of individuals
We first estimate the effects of parenthood on labor market outcomes of all men and
women as well as separately by their level of education (college vs. no college).40 Figure
9 plots the event-time coefficients as a fraction of the predicted counterfactual outcome,
i.e. the gender-specific estimates P gτ . Women’s earnings drop by about 13.5% in the
year they give birth and by another 15.7% in the subsequent year compared to the year
before birth. The earnings decline continues at a slower rate until women’s earnings
are almost 45% lower ten years after birth than they were just prior to parenthood.
Noncollege-educated women face a larger earnings loss than mothers with a college
degree. The earnings of men in the full sample and those without a college degree are
unaffected by parenthood. College-educated men’s earnings increase steadily and ten
years after childbirth are 15% higher than in the year prior to parenthood. Despite
the differing patterns for the three (sub-)samples, long-term child penalties are fairly
similar amounting to 46.8% for all women, 50.0% for college-educated women and
48.5% for mothers without college degree (also see table 23).
To provide a better picture of the sources of the earnings child penalty, we now look
at the three components of earnings, i.e. participation, working hours and wage rates.
Women’s participation rate drops in the year of childbirth and continues decreasing
thereafter. The likelihood to leave the labor force is considerably larger for women with-
out a college degree than for college-educated mothers. Men’s decision to participate in
the labor force is largely unaffected by having children. Overall, this results in long-term
child penalties of 17.7% for all women, 9.2% for mothers with a college degree and
24.3% for lower educated women. Women’s working hours decrease after parenthood
at a rate that roughly mirrors their drop in earnings. Men’s decrease in working hours is
negligible and mostly short-lived. Only men without college education have somewhat
lower working hours in the long run when compared to the year before childbirth. The
long-term child penalties amount to around 43.5% for all and for noncollege-educated
women, and to 36.7% for mothers with a college degree.
The wage rate trajectories differ from the pattern for earnings, participation and
working hours. Women’s wage rates decrease gradually after birth, whereby the reduc-
40The full sample also includes individuals for whom education is unknown (see table 20).
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tion is slightly larger for college- than for noncollege-educated women.41 In contrast,
fathers with a college degree experience a continuous increase in their wage rate that by
far surpasses the wage growth of noncollege-educated fathers. The child penalty is with
20.9% largest for college-educated women who seem to miss out on promotions and
41This is in line with Adda et al. (2017) who find the largest atrophy rates for women in abstract
occupations, which on average require a higher level of education than routine and manual occupations.
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pay raises while their male peers’ hourly wages increase considerably. The child penalty
on lower-educated women is 11.0%, while the penalty for all women amounts to 16.7%.
Overall, much of the earnings child penalty seems to be driven by women’s large
reduction in working hours and to a lesser extent by their decrease in participation.
The gradual drop in women’s wage rates gains in importance over time as a contributor
to the penalty. Yet, we find significant pre-trends for all four outcomes that differ by
gender within a (sub-)sample. In particular, women without a college degree show
downward-sloping pre-trends for earnings, participation and working hours starting
five years before the birth of the child, while there are either no or slightly upward-
sloping pre-trends for noncollege-educated men. The pattern for women could be
due to households that favor a more traditional division of labor where the woman
already reduces her labor supply when getting married.42 Such differences in pre-trends
indicate that the parallel trends assumption required to measure the difference in the
effects of parenthood on men and women may not hold. This also cautions us against
interpreting the estimates as identifying causal effects.
The above results show differential effects of parenthood for college and noncollege-
educated women whereby outcomes tend to be more favorable for the latter. Since fields
of study differ substantially along a variety of dimensions such as skill requirements,
curriculum, career opportunities and hence the student pool they attract, it is likely
that the effects of parenthood on labor market outcomes also differ by field. We now
study the labor market trajectories of all individuals with a college degree separately by
their field of study.43 As depicted in Figure 10, after childbirth earnings decrease for all
high-educated women, while they persistently grow for male graduates. However, there
is substantial heterogeneity by field.
Mothers who graduated in Medicine, Dentistry, Pharmacy or in Science and Mathe-
matics face the lowest earnings loss and male graduates in Medicine, Dentistry, Phar-
macy, Social Sciences and Services register the highest increase in earnings relative
to just before the birth of their first child. The long-term child penalty is lowest for
women in the male-dominated fields of Science and Mathematics (35.7%) and Infor-
matics (40.1%), whereas it is highest for female graduates in Services (58.2%) and Health
42The pre-trend in terms of participation for noncollege-educated women is flatter and starts decreas-
ing later when not imposing a minimum earnings threshold for the participation indicator.
43We omit General Programmes as this is a very small field among the college-educated.
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(51.1%). Yet, overall there is no clear correlation between a field’s gender ratio and
its child penalty as e.g. also the field of Services is slightly male dominated. Further-
more, since individuals sort into fields of study based on unobservables such as ability,
motivation and preferences, this pattern may be due to selection and not necessarily
reflect causal effects of different fields. It is, however, conceivable that employers in
male-dominated fields offer more family-friendly jobs without reducing pay as a com-
pensating differential in order to attract qualified women. Rates of skill depreciation
may also be higher in these fields so that women may avoid (lengthy) career interrup-
tions to not lose out on promotion opportunities or fall (further) back behind their male
peers. Long-term child penalties for all fields and outcomes are provided in Appendix
table 23, but for reasons of brevity will not be discussed in detail.
We also find large differences by field regarding women’s participation, working
hours and wage rate trajectories. Participation rates and working hours again decrease
least for female graduates in Medicine, Dentistry, Pharmacy, and Science and Mathe-
matics, which may be because these fields tend to take longer to complete, increasing
costs of career interruptions and working time reductions. Male college graduates
hardly adjust their labor supply after they have their first child. Their wage rates steadily
increase as they continue to climb the career ladder, though growth rates differ by
field. In contrast, women of all fields see gradual declines in their wage rates, but these
estimates are less precise and partly statistically insignificant. The relative importance
of participation, working hours and wage rates differs by field, so that also the rankings
in terms of long-term child penalties differ for these outcomes. The main driver of the
earnings child penalty again seems to be women’s reduction in working hours, but they
also fall back compared to men because the latter continue to enjoy rising hourly wages.
3.4.2 Labor market trajectories of couples by their relative
earnings potential
To investigate the role of household specialization based on comparative advantages
and bargaining power, we need a measure of individuals’ earnings potential. As men-
tioned above, actual earnings before having the first child are typically measured at an
age where earnings are unstable and are thus less suitable for our purposes. Instead,
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we will use six proxies for earnings potential (three of these are discussed in Appendix
3.6.3).
It is not straightforward what the optimal measure of relative (lifetime) earnings
potential would be. Both partners’ pre-birth earnings potential plays an important
role as it is predictive of future earnings. It is less clear how earnings potential before
birth, but also for later years should be determined. Individuals’ level and field of
education, occupation and work experience are important components44, but may be
44We do not observe individuals’ occupation and work experience, but approximate the latter by age.
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an insufficient measure of unobserved individual ability/productivity. Different types
of education and occupations have differing earnings trajectories that may also vary by
gender.45 It also matters how many years individuals will remain active in the workforce
and reap market returns. If couples have more children after the first one, mothers
will incur further career interruptions for at least the length of maternity leave which
may lead to (further) skill atrophy. These aspects of earnings capacity are to varying
degrees captured by our proxies. Men and women may also derive differential utility
from spending time with their children, such that a more traditional division of labor
may be utility maximizing. Our measures of earnings potential are agnostic of such
differences in preferences.
Combination of educational level
We divide our household sample by partners’ combination of educational level into
seven categories: 1) both have no college degree, 2) only the man has a college degree, 3)
only the woman has a college degree, 4) both have bachelor’s degrees, 5) the man has a
master’s degree, the woman has a bachelor’s degree, 6) the man has a bachelor’s degree,
the woman has a master’s degree, 7) both have master’s degrees. The level of education
is easily observable and clearly correlates with earnings (potential). Yet, it is only a crude
measure of individual productivity and ignores that men and women tend to choose
fields at the same educational level that lead to distinct earnings opportunities.46
The findings from our separate event-study regressions for the seven sub-samples
are presented in figure 11. Earnings decrease by far the most after childbirth for women
who do not have a college degree independent of whether their partner does. Women
who have a master’s degree and are in a partnership with another master’s graduate
experience the lowest drop in earnings followed by all women who have a higher
education than their partner. Nonetheless, none of them converge back to their pre-
birth earnings level. Earnings increase for all men, but most for master’s graduates
who form a household with another master’s graduate and for men who surpass their
partner in terms of education. The long-term child penalties are largest for couples
45As mentioned above, the gender wage gap literature finds that human capital variables like education
contribute little to the gap in recent years, but that gender differences in occupation are still relevant.
46Similar to the other proxies that require information on individuals’ education, we can only conduct
this part of the analysis for couples where we know both partners’ educational attainment (see table 21).
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where the male partner has a higher education than the female and lowest in the reverse
cases. Long-term child penalties for all three measures of relative earnings potential in
this section are provided in table 24, but for reasons of brevity will not be discussed in
detail.
We find a similar picture for participation rates and working hours. Women who
surpass their partner in terms of education reduce their labor supply less than women in
partnerships with the reverse constellation. Men’s participation rates and working hours
hardly change after becoming a parent. The pattern for women’s wage rate trajectories is
less clear and the estimates come with larger confidence intervals. Wage rates decrease
for all women, though the effects are initially insignificant for master’s graduates who
have an equally high-educated partner. These men by far reap the largest increase in
wage rates leading to a long-term child penalty of 22% in this group. Again, the earnings’
trajectories seem primarily shaped by adjustments in working hours.
We also investigate how partners’ labor market adjustments after parenthood affect
their total household earnings and working hours from employment, which are impor-
tant determinants of household utility. Household earnings decrease for all couples
after childbirth though they recover to varying degrees if at least the father has any type
of college degree. Even for couples where both have a master’s degree it takes ten years
to return to their pre-birth earnings level. Driven by women, total household working
hours drop considerably after childbirth with hardly any recovery. In sum, women seem
to make career choices after childbirth based on their absolute and within-household
earnings potential, while men do not adjust their labor supply irrespective of their
relative or absolute earnings capacity. Given that their wage rates and hence earnings
increase, we also find no evidence of men moving to potentially more family-friendly
jobs that pay less as a compensating differential and/or offer fewer opportunities for
career advancement.
Combination of field of study
Next, we use the earnings level of the fields of study of college-educated couples as
proxy. We split the fields by the average earnings of our sample in the 5-year period be-
fore birth into high-, medium-, and low-earnings fields. High-earnings fields comprise
Business, Economics, Law, Science, Mathematics, Informatics, Engineering, Manufac-
turing, Construction, Medicine, Dentistry and Pharmacy. Medium-earnings fields are
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g
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event-time dummies as a fraction of the predicted counterfactual outcome of no children in each year relative to the
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for both partners. The legend abbreviations B and M signify Bachelor’s and Master’s degree, respectively.
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General Programmes, Social Sciences, Agriculture, Veterinary and Services, while we
classify Education, Humanities, Arts and other Health programs as low-earnings fields.
The combination of men’s and women’s fields of study yields nine groups of relative
household earnings potential. The (dis-)advantages of this proxy are similar to using
the combination of educational level. The field of study is only a coarse measure of
individual productivity/ability and broad fields of study comprise programs that have
varying earnings prospects and gender ratios.
Figure 12 presents the results. While before childbirth earnings increase for all
graduates, women’s earnings sharply drop after having a child without any meaningful
recovery during our observation period. In contrast, men’s earnings continue on their
growth path with fairly small differences across household categories. Similar to our
findings above, women that are in a higher-earnings field than their partner experience
a comparatively smaller earnings loss. Consequently, long-term child penalties are
lowest for women who are in a higher-earnings field than their partner.
A similar pattern holds for participation and working hours as women who are in
higher-earnings fields than their partners tend to be less likely to leave the workforce
and they reduce their hours less after having children. However, women in low-earnings
fields with a partner from such a field are also less likely to withdraw from the labor
market and their participation rate starts recovering six years after birth. It may be that
these couples are financially more dependent on the woman’s income. Men’s labor
supply seems hardly affected by parenthood independent of their relative earnings
potential. The effects of having the first child on wage rates do not follow a clear
pattern. Women in the highest-earnings fields experience the largest wage reduction
after parenthood, which could suggest higher skill atrophy in these fields, while men’s
hourly wages rise markedly.
Total household earnings increase considerably in the pre-birth period, but sub-
sequently drop for all households with varying degrees of recovery that are driven by
men’s earnings growth. The drop in total household working hours is persistent for most
groups. Again, we find no indication of household specialization based on comparative
advantage as men do not seem to adjust their labor supply and career choices after
parenthood. Women remain more attached to the labor market if they have a degree
that offers better earnings prospects, but this happens independent of their partner’s
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earnings capacity. Yet, a less traditional division of labor could lead to higher household
earnings for couples where the woman is in a high-earnings field.
Predicted life-cycle earnings
We construct a population sample that comprises all childless men and fathers in the
period before their first child and use it to predict individuals’ lifetime earnings potential
in the absence of children from the year before first birth until the year they turn 60.
To that end, we run a regression of earnings on fully interacted dummy variables for
age, field (12) and level (9) of education. We discount predicted annual earnings by
3% and sum them up to obtain predicted lifetime earnings. Subsequently, we divide
couples into four categories: 1) woman is predicted to earn more than 50,000 euros
more than her partner, 2) woman is predicted to earn ± 50,000 euros of her partner’s
lifetime earnings, 3) woman is predicted to earn between 50,000 to 200,000 euros less
than her partner, 4) woman is predicted to earn more than 200,000 euros less than her
partner.
This proxy accounts better for gender differences in educational choices than the
broad field or level of education. Interacting age with education also incorporates
differential experience profiles for different types of education. The proxy represents a
long-term planning horizon as it comprises both predicted current and future earnings.
It also takes into account within-couple age differences, such that e.g. the younger
spouse may reap higher lifetime earnings even if her/his annual earnings are lower
as she/he will be active on the labor market for a longer period. However, the earn-
ings returns at higher ages are based on an increasingly selective and small sample,
i.e. men who had their first child quite late or never had children. Women may also
reap differential returns to education and experience compared to men, so that these
earnings predictions may give a less accurate estimate of women’s earnings capacity.47
The returns to (types of) education may also change over time, but since such changes
47A similar sample of women in the Dutch population would be even more selective for several reasons:
1) the number of women who remain childless is relatively low, 2) women who have children on average
do so earlier than men, leading to a shorter pre-birth observation period, 3) working reduced hours is
common especially among older generations so that we would estimate the returns to part-time work,
and 4) non-participation rates are also higher among older generations than among the women giving
birth during our observation period.
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are hard to predict for most people, they would likely still draw on current returns when
making decisions on the division of labor.
The findings are presented in figure 13. Women’s earnings losses are fairly similar
across groups in the year of birth as they are subject to the same maternity leave
regulations, but start diverging after that. Women who are predicted to out-earn their
partner or to earn roughly the same over the remainder of their working life face smaller
earnings losses than women who are predicted to earn less than their partner, though
the differences are small. Men’s earnings are either unaffected by childbirth or gradually
decrease somewhat thereafter, though there is no clear pattern discernible.
Looking at the individual components of earnings, we see that women’s labor supply
trajectories mirror their earnings paths. Men’s participation rates and working hours
decrease somewhat after birth, but this decline occurs gradually and is quite similar
across categories of relative household earnings potential. Mothers’ wage rates consis-
tently decrease after birth with the decline again being larger for relatively high-earning
women. Men either register no change in their wage rates or a minor decline that
does not come close to women’s reduction in wages. For all four outcomes, long-term
child penalties are of reasonably similar magnitude across groups. The largest loss in
total household earnings after childbirth is registered by couples where the woman is
predicted to out-earn her partner. It seems that these households do not optimally use
women’s capacity on the labor market to realize higher household income. However,
differences across types of households are relatively small again, especially with regards
to household working hours. Overall, households do not appear to put much weight
on expected future earnings as we detect fairly small differences across groups even
though their relative earnings potentials vary substantially.
In Appendix 3.6.3, we discuss three other measures of relative earnings potential,
namely the within-couple age difference, partners’ relative pre-birth wage rate and
women’s share in the predicted total household earnings in the year before birth. The
results again show little indication of household specialization based on comparative
advantages.
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3.4.3 Use of formal child care
Women with higher earnings potential reduce their working hours less after the birth of
their first child and their partners do not compensate by reducing their working hours.
To shed more light on how these households cope with combining market work and
family duties, we consider the use of formal child care. Use of child care is measured as a
household’s total annual costs spent on formal child care that is eligible for government
subsidies and as total hours that a household’s children spend in formal child care in
a year.48 To that end, we run panel random effects regressions of these child care use
indicators on our proxies for men’s and women’s earnings capacity, year fixed effects
and event-time fixed effects covering the event time period 0 to 10. Our earlier results
indicate that when deciding about labor supply, individuals do not take their relative
earnings potential in the household into account. Therefore, we associate the use of
formal child care to the absolute earnings potential of both partners in the household.
The findings in table 22 indicate that the use of formal child care both in terms
of total annual costs and hours of care is more responsive to an increase in women’s
earnings potential. For women, having a master’s degree compared to no college
education is associated with additional child care spending of 3285 euros per year, while
a similar increase in the male partner’s education is associated with less than half the
increase in spending. As shown in panel II, if the male partner is in a high-earnings
instead of a low-earnings field of study, the household spends on average about 838
euros more on child care, while use of formal care correlates with an almost threefold
higher increase if the female partner would make such a move. Lastly, an increase in
women’s predicted life-cycle earnings is also associated with a larger increase in use
of formal child care than a rise in men’s predicted life-cycle earnings. Overall, this
correlational analysis suggests that in order to combine work and home production,
mothers with higher earnings capacity and stronger attachment to the labor market
buy more formal child care. Appendix table 3.6.4 shows results for the three measures
of earnings potential discussed in appendix section 3.6.3. It confirms the pattern found
here that use of formal child care is more sensitive to women’s earnings potential than
to men’s.
48We do not restrict use to hours of care for the first child as our event-study estimates also include the
effect of children born after the first one.
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Table 22: Use of formal child care by measure of earnings potential
Costs for care Hours of care
β̂ s.e. β̂ s.e.
I. Level of education
Man bachelor’s degree 872.56 (14.65) 134.87 (2.34)
Man master’s degree 1850.64 (18.79) 285.48 (2.98)
Woman bachelor’s degree 1677.78 (14.28) 266.75 (2.29)
Woman master’s degree 3285.36 (18.67) 516.46 (2.97)
II. Field of study
Man medium-earnings field 616.42 (38.00) 98.46 (5.99)
Man high-earnings field 837.93 (26.95) 132.82 (4.25)
Woman medium-earnings field 1588.46 (29.56) 245.57 (4.64)
Woman high-earnings field 2228.90 (24.45) 349.32 (3.87)
III. Predicted life-cycle earnings
Man’s predicted lifetime earnings 0.002595 (0.000026) 0.000404 (0.000004)
Woman’s predicted lifetime earnings 0.004740 (0.000027) 0.000748 (0.000004)
3.5 Conclusion
A number of recent studies has shown that parenthood comes with large earnings
penalties on women, while men are barely affected by having children. We confirm
this result for the Netherlands and document a large and persistent earnings child
penalty that is primarily driven by women’s marked reduction in working hours and
to a lesser extent by lower participation and a gradual decline in wage rates. Child
penalties differ by individuals’ level of education and their field of study at college.
Women who graduated in the male-dominated fields of Science and Mathematics,
and Informatics face the lowest earnings penalty, but this may be due to self-selection
into fields and not necessarily reflect an effect of the field itself. Yet, it is possible that
employers in these fields offer more family-friendly jobs without reducing pay as a
compensating differential in order to attract qualified women. It could also be that
rates of skill depreciation are higher in these fields so that women avoid (lengthy) career
interruptions to not fall back behind their male peers.
One of the potential causes of the child penalty discussed in the literature is house-
hold specialization based on comparative advantages in labor market work and child
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care. Prior research concludes that biological factors can only explain part of short-
run child penalties, but not (the persistence of) long-run penalties so that women
do not seem to have a comparative advantage in child care (Andresen and Nix, 2019;
Kleven et al., forthcoming). This leaves room for household specialization based on
partners’ relative earnings potential within the household. Women who have a higher
earnings capacity than their partner might remain more attached to the labor market,
while their partners take over more child care duties compared to women with a low
within-household earnings potential. To test this hypothesis, we use various measures
of relative earnings potential. All of these have advantages, but also limitations that we
discuss in sections 3.4.2 and 3.6.3.
Nonetheless, our findings across these proxies consistently show little evidence for
household specialization based on comparative advantages and/or bargaining power.
Men’s labor supply on both the extensive and intensive margin is barely affected by
fatherhood irrespective of their relative earnings potential. We partly find some small
decreases in men’s wage rates and total earnings for some types of households, which
could suggest moves to more family-friendly jobs. These findings are not robust across
our proxies for earnings potential and do not show a clear pattern. Men’s gradual
declines in wage rates and earnings are also considerably smaller than the decreases in
wages and earnings that women typically experience.
Women’s earnings losses are smaller if they have a higher relative earnings capac-
ity and they reduce their labor supply less than women with low relative earnings
capacity. Given the absence of effects on men, this pattern does not seem to be a
result of within-household negotiations about the division of market and household
work, even when this could lead to gains in household earnings. It could instead be
driven by differences in absolute earnings potential among women, such that higher-
educated/higher-earning women remain more attached to the workforce after having
children. Descriptive evidence suggests that households where women have a high
earnings capacity make more use of formal child care to enable mothers to combine
work and family. Our results also reject the unitary household model which does not
allow for distinct preferences of men and women in a household and requires, among
others, that marginal compensated wage changes of two individuals in a household
have the same effect on each other’s labor supply.
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We find little evidence for household specialization even though there are hardly
any institutional hurdles to divide household and labor market in a gender-neutral
way in the Netherlands. Based on our results we cannot draw any conclusions about
whether the labor market trajectories we find are instead shaped by preferences or by
gender norms. Part-time work, especially among women, has a long tradition in the
Netherlands and an entitlement to working reduced hours was also entered into law in
2000.
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3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Long-term child penalties - sample of individuals
Table 23: Long-term child penalties - sample of individuals
Earnings Participation Working hours Wage rate
I. Full sample
46.8% 17.7% 43.4% 16.7%
II. Level of education
College 50.0% 9.2% 36.7% 20.9%
No college 48.5% 24.3% 43.8% 11.0%
III. Field of study
Education 45.8% 9.0% 40.4% 9.9%
Humanities & Arts 46.4% 17.1% 35.1% 12.0%
Social Sciences 46.7% 10.8% 30.5% 24.9%
Business, Economics & Law 45.6% 8.0% 33.0% 21.2%
Science & Mathematics 35.7% 6.3% 25.4% 13.3%
Informatics 40.1% 7.1% 29.2% 17.7%
Engineering 43.1% 8.9% 31.6% 15.8%
Agriculture & Veterinary 45.5% 16.3% 39.6% 31.7%
Health 51.1% 10.1% 38.3% 15.3%
Services 58.2% 10.3% 36.8% 26.4%
Medicine, Dentistry & Pharmacy 45.3% 6.3% 32.4% 16.2%
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3.6.2 Long-term child penalties by relative earnings potential
Table 24: Long-term child penalties by relative earnings potential
Earnings Participation Working hours Wage rate
I. Combination of level of education
Both no college 56.7% 29.1% 48.4% 13.5%
Only man college 76.8% 26.5% 50.6% 29.4%
Only woman college 38.4% 8.3% 33.2% 13.8%
Both bachelor’s degrees 57.1% 11.4% 40.8% 21.7%
Man master’s, woman bachelor’s 69.7% 14.3% 42.9% 28.4%
Man bachelor’s, woman master’s 42.9% 7.1% 30.4% 20.3%
Both master’s degrees 49.4% 10.3% 31.0% 22.2%
II. Study field combination
Both low-earnings field 48.3% 7.9% 36.7% 11.5%
Woman low-, man medium-earnings field 63.5% 12.1% 41.8% 30.4%
Woman medium-, man low-earnings field 40.2% 10.0% 29.4% 15.9%
Both medium-earnings field 52.3% 12.9% 34.3% 29.2%
Woman medium-, man high-earnings field 58.9% 14.5% 36.1% 30.4%
Woman high-, man medium-earnings field 46.0% 8.2% 31.5% 27.8%
Both high-earnings field 48.2% 9.8% 32.6% 23.8%
Woman low-, man high-earnings field 68.4% 13.0% 43.3% 24.2%
Woman high-, man low-earnings field 33.6% 6.5% 26.6% 12.7%
III. Woman’s predicted relative life-cycle earnings
> 50,000 euros more than partner 40.0% 18.1% 38.9% 17.4%
± 50,000 euros of partner’s earnings 48.1% 20.8% 42.4% 20.3%
50,000-200,000 euros less than partner 41.2% 22.1% 44.0% 11.8%
> 200,000 euros less than partner 51.0% 23.3% 47.8% 15.7%
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3.6.3 Event-study analysis for further measures of relative earn-
ings potential
As robustness checks, we discuss three other measures of relative earnings potential,
namely the within-couple age difference, partners’ relative pre-birth wage rate and
women’s share in the predicted total household earnings in the year before birth. Long-
term child penalties for all three measures are shown in table 25, but for reasons of
brevity will not be discussed in detail.
Within-couple age difference
We split households by their within-couple age difference into four categories: 1) woman
is more than 2 years older than the man, 2) age difference within ± 2 years, 3) man is 3
to 5 years older than the woman, 4) man is more than 5 years older than the woman.
The older partner in a relationship may have higher (life-cycle) earnings and more
bargaining power in the negotiations about the division of care and market work.
As shown in figure 14, earnings, participation rates and working hours decrease
markedly for women in all sub-samples after having children and this downward trend
continues until the end of our observation period. The drop is smallest for women who
are more than two years older than their partner and highest for women whose partner
is more than five years older than they are, suggesting differences in bargaining power.
Yet, men’s earnings decline only slightly and their labor supply remains unchanged
irrespective of their relative age. Long-term penalties are highest for women with a
considerably older partner, but the differences across the four categories are relatively
small. Wage rates gradually decrease for all men and women, but women who are more
than two years older than their partner again experience the smallest decline and the
lowest long-term child penalty. Overall, labor market trajectories tend to differ little
by relative-age group, which suggests that this is not an important factor that couples
take into account in their division of labor. Nonetheless, total household earnings and
working hours decrease less for households where women remain more attached to the
labor market.
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Notes: Figures (a)-(d) show the estimated coefficients (with confidence intervals) of the event-time dummies as a
fraction of the predicted counterfactual outcome of no children in each year relative to the birth of the first child
separately for men and women, i.e. P
g
τ (defined in 3.2). Figures (e) and (f) show the estimated coefficients of the
event-time dummies as a fraction of the predicted counterfactual outcome of no children in each year relative to the
birth of the first child for household earnings and working hours. Equation 3.1 is modified to include age dummies
for both partners.
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Relative pre-birth wage rate
Next, we classify our household sample by their relative wage rate in the year before
childbirth into three categories: 1) woman earns more than 3 euros more per hour than
her partner, 2) woman earns ± 3 euros of her partner’s hourly wage, 3) woman earns
more than 3 euros less per hour than her partner. Hourly wages are a direct measure
of individual productivity prior to having a child. Women with higher (relative) wage
rates face higher costs of career interruptions and may remain more attached to the
labor market. Like observed total earnings, this proxy may be subject to reversion
to the mean. Individuals with very high (low) pre-birth wage rates may experience
future decreases (increases) in their wage rate if their current wage has a large transitory
(shock) component.49
The pattern we find in figure 15 conforms with expectations that women with a
higher pre-birth wage rate than their partner experience a smaller earnings decline,
are less likely to leave the workforce or reduce their working hours less than women
with a lower relative wage. However, for each of these outcomes the differences across
the three groups only amount to about 10 percentage points. Men who have partners
that earn about the same wage or markedly more as they do before birth see large
increases in earnings after birth, while only slightly reducing their labor supply. This
drives up long-term earnings child penalties which are highest for mothers in these
two household categories. Hourly wages of women with relatively high pre-birth wages
decline most among all three groups of women, whereas their partners’ wage rates
increase considerably in the post-birth period. This suggests that reversion to the mean
is a concern with this proxy for earnings capacity.
Given the mostly small differences among women and increasing wage rates for
men with relatively low pre-birth wage rates, differences in household earnings and
working hours are small. The results overall suggest that households hardly use relative
pre-birth wages as a decision criterion in their negotiations over the distribution of
market and household work, even though there may be scope to increase household
earnings.
49Due to data availability, we can only calculate wage rates from 2006 onward and for employees, so
that the sample reduces to births between 2007 and 2013 among couples where both were employed in
the year prior to birth.
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Notes: Figures (a)-(d) show the estimated coefficients (with confidence intervals) of the event-time dummies as a
fraction of the predicted counterfactual outcome of no children in each year relative to the birth of the first child
separately for men and women, i.e. P
g
τ (defined in 3.2). Figures (e) and (f) show the estimated coefficients of the
event-time dummies as a fraction of the predicted counterfactual outcome of no children in each year relative to the
birth of the first child for household earnings and working hours. Equation 3.1 is modified to include age dummies
for both partners.
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Predicted relative pre-birth earnings potential
Lastly, we use the population sample comprising all childless men and fathers in the
period prior to their first child constructed in section 3.4.2 to predict pre-birth earnings
potential. To that end, we run a regression of earnings on year fixed effects and on fully
interacted dummies for age, field and level of education.50 With the coefficients from
this regression we predict earnings in the year before birth for both men and women.
Predicted household earnings are then calculated as the sum of both partners’ predicted
earnings. Subsequently, we divide households by their relative pre-birth earnings
potential into four categories: 1) woman’s share in predicted household earnings ≥ 0.53;
2) 0.47 ≤ woman’s share < 0.53; 3) 0.40 ≤ woman’s share < 0.47; 4) woman’s share < 0.40.
This proxy offers similar advantages and disadvantages than using predicted life-cycle
earnings, though it does not take a forward-looking perspective. It is also based on a
selective sample as pre-birth earnings for men are mostly included for ages where the
correlation between current earnings and lifetime earnings is low.
The results from our event-study analyses are documented in figure 16. For moth-
ers, the picture is similar to using predicted life-cycle earnings as proxy for earnings
potential. Differences in earnings losses start appearing one year after birth, but remain
small. Women with the highest predicted share in total household earnings experience
smaller earnings reductions than other women. Men that are predicted to contribute
less or a similar amount to household earnings than their partner, realize large increases
in earnings that continue throughout the 10-year post-birth horizon. Consequently,
long-term earnings child penalties are largest for women in these two categories.
Women with a higher predicted contribution to household earnings reduce their
labor supply less, both on the extensive and the intensive margin. Men barely adjust
their working hours and rarely leave the labor force after having children. The small
differences in long-term child penalties across groups therefore arise from women’s
differential adjustment to parenthood. Wage rates decrease for all women, though
the decline is smallest for women who are predicted to contribute less than 40% to
household earnings. There may be less scope for decreases in wage rates for lower-
earning individuals (e.g. due to minimum wage laws). The earnings growth for men
who are predicted to earn less or about the same as their partner is driven by continual
50We now distinguish between 111 fields of education and twelve levels of education.
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increases in their hourly wages. Given the strong increase in earnings of relatively low-
earning men, household earnings drop least after childbirth for this group compared
to the other three types of households. The differences across groups are initially
similar and start diverging in the year after birth, but remain relatively small during our
observation period. A similar pattern can be found for household working hours. Again,
we find little evidence of household specialization based on comparative advantages in
market work as men’s career paths seem independent of parenthood, while women’s
trajectories differ only moderately by their predicted pre-birth earnings potential.
Table 25: Long-term child penalties by relative earnings potential - robustness checks
Earnings Participation Working hours Wage rate
I. Within-couple age difference
Woman > 2 years older 36.6% 12.9% 39.6% 7.2%
Similar age (± 2 years) 41.7% 17.0% 45.3% 11.0%
Man 3-5 years older 38.4% 18.1% 46.3% 7.5%
Man > 5 years older 42.4% 25.8% 49.1% 9.9%
II. Relative pre-birth wage rate of women
> 3 euros more than partner 50.7% 9.7% 32.9% 32.2%
± 3 euros of partner’s wage 54.5% 13.7% 40.3% 24.3%
> 3 euros less than partner 39.7% 18.1% 45.0% 5.8%
III. Woman’s share in predicted pre-birth household earnings
Woman’s share ≥ 0.53 55.5% 18.2% 39.4% 31.6%
0.47 ≤ woman’s share < 0.53 53.3% 17.9% 41.8% 25.3%
0.40 ≤ woman’s share < 0.47 46.1% 20.2% 43.6% 16.8%
Woman’s share < 0.40 37.4% 23.7% 44.7% 3.7%
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g
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event-time dummies as a fraction of the predicted counterfactual outcome of no children in each year relative to the
birth of the first child for household earnings and working hours. Equation 3.1 is modified to include age dummies
for both partners.
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3.6.4 Use of formal child care for further measures of earn-
ings potential
Table 26 shows the results from our random effects regressions for the three measures
of earnings potential discussed in the previous section. We again find that a household’s
use of formal child care correlates more strongly with an increase in women’s earnings
potential - as measured by their pre-birth wage rate and their predicted pre-birth
earnings - than with an increase in men’s. Households where women are older when
having their first child also make considerably more use of child care, while no such
association can be found for men.
Table 26: Use of formal child care by measure of earnings potential - robustness checks
Costs for care Hours of care
β̂ s.e. β̂ s.e.
I. Age
Man’s age 1.84 (1.46) 0.12 (0.23)
Woman’s age 159.16 (1.64) 24.92 (0.26)
II. Pre-birth wage rate of women
Man’s wage rate 34.33 (2.69) 5.15 (0.41)
Woman’s wage rate 94.90 (8.82) 14.58 (1.35)
III. Predicted pre-birth household earnings
Man’s predicted pre-birth earnings 0.0534 (0.0006) 0.0083 (0.0001)
Woman’s predicted pre-birth earnings 0.0987 (0.0007) 0.0155 (0.0001)

CHAPTER 4
Do doctors improve the health care
of their parents? Evidence from
admission lotteries51
4.1 Introduction
Many policy makers aim at equal access to health care for all. Even in countries with
universal health insurance coverage and almost free health care, health care use may,
however, differ between people for reasons unrelated to their health. These reasons
include: i) information limitations about health risks, adequate preventive behavior
or treatment options, ii) patients’ inability to communicate with their health care
providers, and iii) providers treating patients of different backgrounds differently. A
recent literature examines the combined effect of these reasons by comparing outcomes
of doctors and their relatives to those of a control group (Chen et al., 2019; Chou et al.,
2006; Frakes et al., 2019; Grytten et al., 2011; Johnson and Rehavi, 2016; Leuven et al.,
2013). The idea in these studies is that doctors and their relatives have full access
to medical expertise and services so that their health care use and outcomes are not
affected by any of these reasons.
51This chapter is based on Artmann et al. (forthcoming).
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The main challenge in this literature is to isolate the effects of doctors’ expertise
and access to services from other factors that cause outcomes of doctors and their
relatives to differ from those of other people. Doctors have a profession that comes
with irregular working hours and is physically more demanding and more stressful than
most other professions. Moreover, doctors select themselves into their profession which
may be related to their initial health condition or their attitudes towards health. Similar
concerns pertain to the relatives of doctors. Doctors typically come from more educated
families, and doctors choose different partners and have different fertility patterns than
non-doctors (e.g. Artmann et al., 2018). To deal with these issues, most existing studies
use an extensive set of control variables, including risk factors and baseline health, and
focus on specific health conditions.52
We contribute to this literature by using admission lotteries to medical school in the
Netherlands to study how health outcomes of parents are affected by having a child who
is a doctor. We compare outcomes of the parents whose child won the admission lottery
to medical school and became a doctor to the outcomes of parents whose child lost this
lottery and did not become a doctor. By looking at parents of doctors instead of doctors
themselves, our results are not contaminated by the impact that working conditions
may have on doctors’ own health. At the moment the child applies to medical school,
parents have long completed their education and made their occupation choice and
other major labor market decisions. Therefore, parents of students who were admitted
to medical school on the basis of lotteries are on average similar to the parents of
applicants who lost the admission lottery, which eliminates selection bias. Furthermore,
by looking at parents instead of other relatives, our results are not contaminated by
doctors’ partner choices and fertility decisions, or by endogenous study choices of
siblings. Because children are more likely to care for aging parents than for aging uncles
and aunts, parents are the relatives for whom it is most likely to find a treatment effect.
It is a priori not clear how parents’ health care use and outcomes are affected by
having a child who is a doctor. Various forces are at work. Doctors may provide in-
52Chou et al. (2006) and Johnson and Rehavi (2016) find a lower incidence of C-sections among doctors
and their relatives than among other women in Taiwan and the US. Grytten et al. (2011) find that doctors
and their relatives are more likely to have a C-section than other women in Norway. These different
results can in part be explained by the different financial incentives in hospitals between the countries.
Frakes et al. (2019) find that military doctors in the US do only slightly better than other military officers.
Using Swedish admission lotteries to medical school and an event study comparing doctors to lawyers,
Chen et al. (2019) find that relatives of doctors have more favorable health outcomes.
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formation about preventive behavior. This reduces parents’ demand for care if they
behave more healthy, but may also increase demand for care through, for example,
regular screenings and flu shots. Doctors may also convince parents to take prescribed
medication and to complete treatments. This does not need to change the amount of
formal care, but would increase the quality of care and thus improve parents’ health out-
comes. Furthermore, doctors may be better in recognizing symptoms in an early stage.
This may lead to earlier diagnosis, which increases health care use in the short run, but
may reduce it in the longer run. Finally, doctors may use their knowledge and network
to obtain treatment for their parents. They could try to direct them immediately to a
specialist rather than first going to a GP. Or they may provide additional information to
the GP or specialist to help them make a better diagnosis and decision about providing
subsequent treatments. This changes the type of health care and may also affect the
costs of health care.53 All forces operate in the direction of lowering the mortality of
doctors’ parents, which is our key outcome variable. It is an empirical question whether
the combined effect of these forces increases or decreases health care use of doctors’
parents. In our analysis we consider total health care costs, different types of health
care use and various hospital diagnoses and medication use. This provides a detailed
picture of how doctors affect the health care of their parents.
We use data from different registers that are available at Statistics Netherlands and
that can be linked at the individual level and at the parent-child level. We combine
the registers on admission lotteries for medical school, on educational attainment, on
health care professionals, on mortality, and on health care use and costs, covering the
full population.
When we consider the full population independent of children’s level of education,
we find strong associations between children having a medical degree and parents’
mortality and health care use. Fathers and mothers of doctors live longer, have lower
health care costs and are less likely to visit a GP, to be hospitalized or to take any
prescription medication. They are, however, slightly more likely to be treated by a
specialist. These associations are weaker, but still hold when we restrict the sample to
parents of children with a college degree.
53We ignore that becoming a doctor has substantial earnings returns (Ketel et al., 2016), which could
increase health investments for parents. Furthermore, being a doctor may change labor supply and the
amount of leisure available to meet parents. Both channels are probably of second order importance in a
small country like the Netherlands with extensive universal health insurance.
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Next, we exploit the randomization of the admission lotteries to medical school to
control for selection into the medical profession. We use the result of the first admission
lottery as instrumental variable for practicing as a doctor. The estimation results show
causal effects on mortality which are close to zero and not significantly different from
zero. For health care use and costs most estimates are not significantly different from
zero, although for some outcome variables estimates are too imprecise to rule out
substantial effects. Taken together, the results indicate that having access to medical
expertise and services through a child who is a doctor is not an important cause of
differences in parents’ health care use and mortality.
Our paper is related to three other literatures. First, to the literature on inequity in
access to health care, which tends to conclude that access is biased towards high SES
groups.54 Second, to the literature on the effect of education on health outcomes, which
shows mixed findings about the causal impact of education on health.55 And third, to
the recent literature on the relationship between adult children’s education and parents’
longevity, where studies find a positive association and sometimes a positive causal
impact.56 Our paper is most closely related to Chen et al. (2019), who study the same
research question using admission lotteries to medical school in Sweden and an event
study comparing health outcomes of relatives of doctors and lawyers.57 Their results
differ from ours. After the presentation of our findings, we discuss possible reasons for
these differences.
54See Van Doorslaer et al. (2006) and Van Doorslaer et al. (2004). Individuals with higher education
and/or income have better access to primary care (Angerer et al., 2019; Olah et al., 2013), to certain health
services after a stroke (Kapral et al., 2002) or to specialized cardiac services (Alter et al., 1999) and have
shorter waiting times for non-emergency hospital treatment (Monstad et al., 2014; Moscelli et al., 2018;
Siciliani and Verzulli, 2009).
55Higher educated individuals live longer and are in better health throughout the lifespan. The
evidence on a causal link is, however, mixed. Lleras-Muney (2005), Oreopoulos (2006) and Van Kippersluis
et al. (2011) find that more education improves health outcomes, but Clark and Royer (2013), Meghir
et al. (2018) and Malamud et al. (2018) find no support for this. See Galama et al. (2018) and Eide and
Showalter (2011) for reviews.
56See Friedman and Mare (2014), Torssander (2013, 2014) and Zimmer et al. (2007) for correlational
studies. Lundborg and Majlesi (2018) and De Neve and Fink (2018) apply instrumental variable ap-
proaches to estimate causal impacts. Fadlon and Nielsen (2019) analyze how health behaviors and
investments are shaped through intra- and intergenerational family spillovers. They find that spouses
and adult children immediately increase their health investments and improve their health behaviors in
response to family health shocks.
57We wish to point out that our paper is not written to replicate Chen et al. (2019). We requested the
data for this project from Statistics Netherlands in September 2017, long before we saw a first draft of the
Chen et al paper in January 2019.
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This paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 provides details on the health care
system in the Netherlands and the admission lotteries. Section 4.3 describes the data.
Section 4.4 first discusses the associations between having a child who is a doctor and
parents’ mortality and health care use, then it introduces the empirical approach and
presents instrumental variables estimates of the causal effects. Section 4.5 summarizes
and concludes.
4.2 Institutional background
This section first gives a brief overview of the Dutch health care system. Next, it describes
the admission lotteries to medical school, and the study program to become a doctor.
4.2.1 Health care system in the Netherlands
Since the implementation of the Health Insurance Act in January 2006, all Dutch res-
idents are legally obliged to purchase a basic health insurance package from private
insurers.58 Private insurers cannot reject applicants and are not allowed to charge
different prices for the same package. In 2019, adults pay an annual community-rated
premium of about 1200 euro. The government pays the premium for children under 18
years old and subsidizes individuals whose income is too low to afford the premium.
The government collects an almost equal amount from general taxation which can be
considered an income-dependent premium. These tax revenues are distributed among
the private insurers on a risk-adjusted basis for their insured population (Kroneman
et al., 2016).
The central government defines the content of the basic package. This covers med-
ical care, including care provided by GPs, hospitals, specialists and midwives, and
prescription drugs.59 Every insured person over age 18 pays an annual deductible of 385
58The discussion in this subsection relies on Wammes et al. (2014).
59In addition, the basic care package covers dental care until age 18 (coverage after age 18 is confined
to specialist dental care and dentures); medical aids and devices; maternity care; ambulance and patient
transport services; paramedical care (limited physical/remedial therapy, speech therapy, occupational
therapy, and dietary advice); basic ambulatory mental health care for mild to moderate mental disorders;
and specialized outpatient and inpatient mental care for complicated and severe mental disorders.
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euro (in 2019) for health-care costs,60 including costs for hospital admission, medical
transportation and prescription drugs but excluding costs for GP consultations, ma-
ternity care, home nursing care and care for children under the age of 18.61 Voluntary
supplemental health insurance is available for services not included in the basic health
insurance package. In 2017, about 84 percent of all individuals had some form of sup-
plemental health insurance, the most popular services being dental care, physiotherapy,
glasses and contact lenses (Wammes et al., 2014).
The Netherlands spent 9.9 percent of its GDP on health care in 2018, which is similar
to most other OECD countries but considerably lower than the health care expenditure
of the US which in the same year amounted to 16.9 percent of its GDP (OECD, 2020c).
Primary care is foremost provided by GPs who act as gatekeepers for access to hospital
and specialist care. Only seven percent of contacts with a GP result in a referral to
secondary care (Kroneman et al., 2016). With 3.3 doctors per 1000 inhabitants, the
density of doctors in the Netherlands is similar to that in other OECD countries (OECD,
2020a).
4.2.2 The admission lotteries
Students who completed the academic track in secondary school in the Netherlands are
eligible to enroll in all study programs at all Dutch universities.62 Some study programs
require that students have followed specific subjects at secondary schools, but programs
are not allowed to select students based on grades or other student characteristics.63 A
number of study programs have quotas that limit how many students can be admitted.
For medical school the quota was introduced in response to the drastically increasing
60People can reduce their insurance premium by taking additional deductibles up to 500 euros per
year. These voluntary deductibles are not very popular, and particularly not among older individuals. In
our sample of parents of medical school applicants, less than 7 percent have some additional deductible
and there is no significant difference between parents of lottery winners and lottery losers.
61In addition to the deductible, individuals need to share some costs for selected services such as
medical transportation via copayments, coinsurance or direct payments for services that are subsidized
to a certain limit. A reimbursement limit is set for drugs in groups of equivalent drugs such that excess
costs above this limit are not reimbursed.
62The information in this subsection largely follows Ketel et al. (2016).
63Graduating from secondary school requires an exam in seven subjects including Dutch and English.
Applicants for medical school should also have passed biology, chemistry, physics and math. Once the
exam is passed it cannot be retaken.
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number of applicants at the end of the 1960s which exceeded the number of study
places available.64
Until 1999, students who applied to medical school (and any other study program
with a quota) were admitted on the basis of the results from a nationwide centralized
lottery.65 The lottery first determines which students can enroll in medical school and
next distributes these students over the eight medical schools in the Netherlands. Based
on their GPA on the secondary school exam, students are divided into categories, which
determine students’ weights in the admission lottery. Table 27 shows that students with
a GPA exceeding 8.5 are in category A and they receive a weight of 2.00, while students
with a GPA between 6 and 6.5 are assigned to category F with a weight of 0.67.66 The
category Other includes students who did not take the Dutch secondary school exams,
e.g. foreign students, who will be excluded from our empirical analysis.
Rejected applicants are allowed to reapply in the next year, and until 1999 they could
do this as often as they wanted. We observe that many but not all rejected first-time
applicants reapplied at least once. This implies that admission to medical school is not
only determined by lottery results. In our empirical analysis we will therefore use the
result of the first lottery in which someone participated as instrumental variable for
becoming a doctor.
4.2.3 The study program
During our observation period, the study program at medical school consisted of up
to three phases (Ketel et al., 2016). In the first phase, students follow four years of
fulltime medical education to receive their undergraduate diploma.67 In the second
phase, students receive two more years of on-the-job training which qualifies them
for the basic degree, which is necessary to be included in the Dutch registry of health
64See Goudappel (1999) for details on the reasons for introducing quotas.
65From 2000 onward, studies with quotas are allowed to admit (initially) at most 50 percent of the
students using their own criteria. Universities have made increasing use of this and by now, the admission
lotteries have been eliminated. Selection is often based on motivation and previous experience. For this
reason we restrict our analysis to students who first applied for medical school before this change.
66The number of available places per lottery category is determined such that for the total number of
available places divided by the number of applicants in a category, the weights hold.
67Like in other European countries, the structure of university education in the Netherlands is different
from that in the US. Students immediately enter a specific field of study (such as medicine, law, or
economics) and their entire curriculum is in that field.
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Table 27: Lottery categories
Category GPA Weight Share
A 8.5 ≤ GPA ≤ 10 2.00 1.7%
B 8.0 ≤ GPA < 8.5 1.50 5.4%
C 7.5 ≤ GPA < 8.0 1.25 8.6%
D 7.0 ≤ GPA < 7.5 1.00 20.8%
E 6.5 ≤ GPA < 7.0 0.80 22.1%
F 6.0 ≤ GPA < 6.5 0.67 29.9%
Other – 1.00 11.5%
Note: GPA describes the average of the student’s final exam grades at secondary school. In the Nether-
lands, grades are between 1 and 10, with 5.5 and higher means passing. Weight is the weight in the
admission lottery and Share describes the fraction of the applying students in each lottery category.
care professionals. This registration is required to enter the labor market for medical
professionals. Less than 20 percent of those who enroll in medical school stop after the
second phase and seek employment as basisarts. The vast majority continues to the
third phase and enrolls in a specialization track, which commonly includes obtaining a
PhD degree. The specialization tracks vary in duration ranging from three years for e.g.
general practitioners to six years for, for example, surgeons and neurologists.
4.3 Data
This section describes the data used in the empirical analysis and provides summary
statistics of the data.
4.3.1 Data sources and sample
We use administrative data from different registers available at Statistics Netherlands
which can be linked at the individual level and at the parent-child level.68
The register on admission lotteries contains information on all applicants for medi-
cal school, their lottery category and the results in all lotteries. Lottery information is
available for the years 1987 to 2004 (Statistics Netherlands, 2020p). To make sure that
68Individual-level demographic variables stem from the person registry (Statistics Netherlands, 2020g)
and the household registry (Statistics Netherlands, 2020e). Children and parents can be linked using
Statistics Netherlands (2020m).
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we observe first-time applicants, we exclude applicants who participated in 1987 since
we have no information about possible participation in 1986, and we exclude applicants
older than 20 when we observe them applying for the first time. Because the lottery
system was gradually abandoned after 1999, we exclude individuals applying for the
first time after that year.69
From the lottery register we exclude applicants of whom at least one parent is
registered as doctor in the register of health care professionals (Statistics Netherlands,
2020c), because for these parents having a child who is a doctor adds little medical
expertise. This eliminates 12.9 percent of the applicants who won their first lottery and
12.2 percent of the applicants who lost their first lottery (p=0.083). The register of health
care professionals was established in 1994 and mandated every health care professional
to be registered in order to practice in the Netherlands.70 We have information on actual
study choices of all applicants and their study progress. For the lottery applicants we
observe who enters the register and thus becomes a doctor.
About 90 percent of the fathers of the lottery applicants are born between 1934 and
1952, and 90 percent of the mothers were born between 1938 and 1954.71 The mortality
register contains all deaths from 1995 until 2019 (Statistics Netherlands, 2020f), so the
oldest parents were in their late fifties when the mortality register started.
Data availability on health care use and health care costs varies because different
data are provided by different institutions. We have access to health care costs that
are reimbursed by the basic health insurance package (available from 2009 to 2017,
Statistics Netherlands (2020v)), specialist visits and treatment costs (2013-2017, Statis-
tics Netherlands (2020r)) and prescription medicine use coded according to the 4-digit
Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC4) classification (2006-2017, Statistics Nether-
lands (2020q)). The register on prescription drugs covers medicine that is (partially)
reimbursed by the statutory health insurance, but excludes drugs provided in hospitals
69We also drop applicants from lottery category A because only 68 applicants in this category lost the
first lottery, 42 of them were admitted to medical school in the next year.
70We cannot identify parents with a medical degree who were never registered because they stopped
working as health care professional before 1994. However, the oldest children were born in 1967 and if
the parents worked until (early) retirement, then we might only miss parents who were in their very late
thirties at the birth of their child. In robustness checks, we also exclude individuals where either parent is
registered as nurse. This does not alter the conclusions.
71For 5.9 percent of the lottery applicants in our sample we can not link a father and for 3.0 percent we
can not link a mother.
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and nursing homes.72 We use hospitalization records (1995-2017, Statistics Netherlands
(2020n,o)) which comprise information on all hospital visits including those without
overnight stay, main diagnosis according to the International Classification of Diseases
(ICD9 and ICD10-classification) and some characteristics of the admitting hospital.73
Our measure of total annual costs comprises all health care costs covered by basic
health insurance, which includes GP, pharmacy and hospital costs, costs for paramedical
care, mental health care, geriatric rehabilitation, home care, patient transports, oral care,
health care provided abroad and some other health care. Annual hospital costs include
both inpatient and outpatient costs. Annual total, GP, pharmacy and hospital costs are
from the data on reimbursements of the basic health insurance package, annual GP
visit is also based on these data and equals one if there were positive GP consultation
costs within a year. Specialist visit and treatment costs are from the records of diagnosis
treatment combinations. Most specialist costs are also included in hospital costs of the
basic health insurance package. All costs are converted to euros in 2015 and describe
the combined spendings born by the insurer and the out-of-pocket payments of the
patient. In the year that parents die we consider unadjusted health-care costs for that
year.74 Observations for the years after dying are ignored in the empirical analysis.
In addition to the sample of lottery participants, we also use the Statistics Nether-
lands register data to construct a sample from the general population containing all
individuals born between 1967 and 1982 and their parents. We refer to this sample as the
"full population". The children in this sample have the same birth years as the lottery
participants. From this "full population" we construct a sample of college graduates and
their parents. We refer to this sample as the "college graduates".75 The "full population"
and "college graduates" are used to determine associations between having a child who
is a doctor and parents’ mortality and health care use.76
72The records do not contain information on the quantity prescribed so that we only observe whether
drugs from a specific ATC4 category were used in a year.
73Statistics Netherlands does not have outpatient records so that we can only identify parents having a
specific disease or condition if the diagnosis was made in the hospital.
74Health care costs are highest just before dying, so annualizing costs for people who die early in the
year would give extreme observations.
75In the Netherlands, individuals can obtain a college degree from a research university ("Wetenschap-
pelijk Onderwijs", WO) or from a professional college ("Hoger Beroepsonderwijs", HBO).
76Information on educational attainment for the lottery applicants and "college graduates" is drawn
from Statistics Netherlands (2020i,j,k,l).
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4.3.2 Descriptive statistics
The upper panel in Table 28 reports summary statistics on study enrollment and com-
pletion by the result of the first lottery. Almost 94 percent of the applicants admitted to
medical school in their first lottery actually enroll in the program. About 45 percent of
the first-time lottery losers enroll in medical school after winning a subsequent lottery.77
Almost all lottery winners enroll in a study program in the Netherlands, while about 96
percent of the losers do so. The share of lottery winners who complete medical school
amounts to 82 percent, while the share among lottery losers is almost 41 percent. About
96 percent of lottery winners and 93 percent of lottery losers complete a study program
in the Netherlands.
Table 28: Sample description by outcome of the first lottery
Winners Losers
Enrollment in medical school 93.8% 45.1%
Completion of medical school 82.4% 40.8%
Enrollment in a study program in NL 99.5% 96.3%
Completion of a study program in NL 96.1% 93.2%
Registration as doctor 80.6% 42.5%
Registered as GP 28.8% 30.9%
Registered as specialist 54.4% 51.9%
Registered without specialization 16.8% 17.2%
N 10,209 11,998
The bottom panel shows that almost all lottery winners that complete medical
school also register as doctor. For lottery losers the fraction of licensed doctors is larger
than the medical school completion rate. Some lottery losers complete medical school
abroad (most likely Belgium) and then practice in the Netherlands. The lottery losers
who complete medical school distribute themselves similarly as the lottery winners
over the different types of doctors. About 30 percent of the doctors become GPs, about
53 percent register as specialist and about 17 percent either do not specialize or work as
social doctor.78
77The reapplication rate among first-time lottery losers in category B is 81 percent. This rate decreases
with lottery category, i.e. with the weight individuals receive in the lottery, to 67 percent in category F.
78Social doctors comprise, for instance, occupational health doctors, doctors for mentally disabled,
community doctors, etc.
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Table 29 shows that pre-treatment characteristics do not differ significantly between
the parents of the winners and losers of the first lottery for medical school. The only
exception is the 0.9 percentage point difference in the shares of parents being married
or cohabiting in the pre-lottery year, which is significant at the 10% level.79 Table A1 in
online appendix A.1 shows balancing of pre-treatment characteristics of the applicants
to medical school. None of the differences is significantly different from zero.
Table 29: Balancing of parental characteristics by outcome of the first medical school
lottery application
Lottery winners Lottery losers p-value
Fathers’ annual income in 1999 56,713 57,059 0.54
Mothers’ annual income in 1999 14,785 14,775 0.99
Annual parental income in 1999 67,666 68,415 0.37
Fathers’ average annual income 1999-2003 53,739 53,906 0.69
Mothers’ average annual income 1999-2003 15,186 15,234 0.83
Average annual parental income 1999-2003 64,981 65,706 0.35
Parents married/cohabiting pre-lottery year 86.8% 87.7% 0.07
Fathers’ number of children 2.75 2.72 0.32
Mothers’ number of children 2.70 2.68 0.45
Fathers’ age at birth of applicant 30.5 30.5 0.68
Mothers’ age at birth of applicant 28.3 28.3 0.84
Notes: Observations are weighted by the inverse probability of winning the lottery for each lottery
category-lottery year combination to account for compositional differences between the two groups. The
p-values in the final column are based on regressing the characteristics on an indicator for winning the
first lottery and fixed effects for the lottery category interacted with the year of first application.
Table 30 lists the fields of study chosen by lottery losers who pursue another study
in the Netherlands. The most popular alternative fields of study are within social sci-
ences (Business and Economics, Psychology) and sciences (Science, Mathematics and
Computing). Some lottery losers enroll in programs that have some health component
(Nursing and Dentistry), but these programs yield considerably less medical knowledge
than medical school and do not allow to practice medicine.
79Information on marriages and registered partnerships is drawn from Statistics Netherlands (2020h),
information on cohabitation from Statistics Netherlands (2020t). Annual earnings are computed as sum
of income from employment (Statistics Netherlands, 2020b), income from self-employment (Statistics
Netherlands, 2020u), income from abroad (Statistics Netherlands, 2020a) and income from other sources
(Statistics Netherlands, 2020s).
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Table 30: Study fields of lottery losers (enrolled)
Field Share
Business and Economics 12.5%
Science, Mathematics and Computing 10.7%
Psychology 10.0%
Health (e.g. Nursing, Dentistry) 8.8%
Law 8.3%
Pharmacy 7.9%
Health science, Movement science and Health care management 7.8%
Education 7.2%
Medical diagnostics and treatment techniques 6.7%
Engineering, Manufacturing and Construction 6.5%
Humanities and Arts 4.5%
Therapy and rehabilitation 3.3%
Others (Social sciences, Agriculture & Veterinary, Services, Welfare) 5.8%
4.4 Results
This section first reports OLS estimates of the correlation of having a child who is a
doctor and parents’ mortality and health care use in our three samples. Next, we exploit
the admission lotteries for medical school to eliminate selection bias into the medical
profession. This allows us to determine the causal effects of having a child who is a
doctor on parents’ mortality and health care use. Our main finding is that while the
correlations are substantial, the causal effects show no evidence of large effects of
having a child who is a doctor on parents’ health care use and mortality.
4.4.1 Association of having a child who is a doctor with parental
health outcomes
We first regress within the full population the different outcome variables of parents
on whether their child is registered as doctor. In the OLS regressions, we control for
gender and ethnicity of the child, fixed effects for the birth years of child and parent, and
fixed effects for the years in which the outcome is observed. The sample is restricted
to parents with children born between 1967 and 1982. We cluster standard errors at
the level of the parent. The estimation results presented in the upper panel in Table
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31 show that almost all outcome variables are more favorable for parents of doctors,
and differences are always significant. The magnitudes of the estimated coefficients
are very similar for fathers and mothers. Because it is very unlikely that we control for
all relevant heterogeneity between parents of doctors and parents of non-doctors, the
estimates should be interpreted as associations rather than causal effects.
Fathers of doctors are 7 percentage points less likely to have died by the end of
2019 compared to fathers of children not practicing as doctor, and this difference is
4.5 percentage points for mothers. The annual health care costs of parents of doctors
are over 500 euros lower. These lower costs are due to lower costs for GP consultations,
pharmaceuticals, hospital admissions and treatment by a specialist. The parents of
doctors are less likely to visit a GP, to be prescribed any type of medication and to
be hospitalized. They are, however, 0.8 to 1.0 percentage points more likely to visit a
specialist.
The middle panel of Table 31 shows results when we restrict the sample to the
parents of college graduates. The coefficients have the same sign as in the full sample,
indicating that parents of doctors have more favorable outcomes than parents of other
college graduates. However, the magnitudes of the estimates are smaller than in the full
sample and some estimates are no longer significantly different from zero, particularly
for mothers. The negative association of the child being a doctor with fathers’ (mothers’)
mortality reduces to 2.8 (1.3) percentage points. The estimate for the difference in total
health care costs declines to about 100 euros.
The bottom panel of Table 31 shows results when we restrict the sample to parents
of lottery participants. Because there is substantial noncompliance with the outcome of
the first lottery, these results have no causal interpretation. The resulting OLS estimates
show that the differences in outcomes between parents of doctors and non-doctors
decrease substantially compared to the results in both other panels and many of the es-
timates are not significantly different from zero. The negative association with parental
mortality reduces further in magnitude compared to the estimates in the upper and
middle panels. For GP costs we find that both fathers and mothers of doctors have
significantly lower costs, but the effects are of economically negligible size. The change
in results compared to the sample of college graduates shows that parents of lottery
applicants differ from parents of other college graduates.
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Table 31: Association of child being a doctor with parental mortality and health care
access, use and costs
Fathers Mothers
Mean β̂ s.e Mean β̂ s.e
Panel A. Full population
Mortality (by 31.12.2019) 0.248 −0.070 (0.003) 0.139 −0.045 (0.002)
Total costs 4533 −547.64 (42.22) 3711 −523.52 (34.74)
GP visit (0/1) 0.838 −0.014 (0.002) 0.870 −0.013 (0.002)
GP costs 139 −21.92 (0.67) 141 −22.33 (0.65)
Specialist visit (0/1) 0.598 0.008 (0.003) 0.568 0.010 (0.003)
Specialist treatment costs 2228 −207.38 (36.12) 1694 −170.59 (30.29)
Any medication 0.836 −0.017 (0.002) 0.860 −0.013 (0.002)
Pharmacy costs 624 −91.47 (10.55) 551 −92.01 (9.08)
Hospitalization (0/1) 0.139 −0.013 (0.001) 0.129 −0.010 (0.001)
Hospital costs 2950 −274.18 (32.22) 2218 −227.84 (23.25)
N 3,057,971 3,220,845
Panel B. College graduates
Mortality (by 31.12.2019) 0.212 −0.028 (0.003) 0.113 −0.013 (0.002)
Total costs 4075 −132.25 (42.27) 3209 −72.13 (34.88)
GP visit 0.837 −0.012 (0.002) 0.866 −0.010 (0.002)
GP costs 127 −10.57 (0.67) 126 −8.96 (0.65)
Specialist visit (0/1) 0.599 0.011 (0.003) 0.565 0.016 (0.003)
Specialist treatment costs 2050 −35.84 (36.02) 1517 −0.79 (30.14)
Any medication 0.823 −0.002 (0.002) 0.843 0.002 (0.002)
Pharmacy costs 553 −24.17 (10.58) 459 −8.09 (9.15)
Hospitalization (0/1) 0.129 −0.002 (0.001) 0.116 0.002 (0.001)
Hospital costs 2680 −39.08 (32.26) 1967 −11.44 (23.34)
N 950,881 985,496
Panel C. Medicine lottery participants
Mortality (by 31.12.2019) 0.191 −0.009 (0.005) 0.105 −0.010 (0.004)
Total costs 3986 −52.18 (80.53) 3173 −50.69 (64.71)
GP visit 0.830 −0.011 (0.003) 0.859 −0.005 (0.003)
GP costs 119 −6.00 (1.25) 120 −5.91 (1.23)
Specialist visit (0/1) 0.607 0.016 (0.005) 0.582 0.002 (0.005)
Specialist treatment costs 2044 17.54 (63.76) 1533 29.84 (47.50)
Any medication 0.822 0.006 (0.004) 0.845 0.010 (0.003)
Pharmacy costs 539 −24.14 (22.62) 459 2.39 (16.70)
Hospitalization (0/1) 0.127 0.002 (0.002) 0.116 0.002 (0.002)
Hospital costs 2652 6.86 (60.87) 1963 −25.45 (44.09)
N 20,900 21,547
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include controls for gender and
ethnicity of the child, fixed effects for the child’s and parent’s year of birth, and fixed effects for the year
the outcome is observed. All costs are converted to euros in 2015. The means in panels A and B are
weighted to mirror the age distribution of medical school applicants.
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4.4.2 Causal evidence from admission lotteries
Within the full population, parents of doctors have lower mortality and lower health care
use and costs than parents of non-doctors. A substantial part of this difference is due to
selection. Restricting the control group to parents of non-doctors who are more similar
to the doctors reduces the differences. Still, even in the sample of lottery participants
doctors are not a random subsample due to noncompliance with the outcome of the
first admission lottery. In this subsection, we use an instrumental variables approach to
deal with this noncompliance and recover causal effects of the child being a doctor on
parents’ mortality and health care use and costs.
Empirical approach and first-stage results
We are interested in the effects of being a doctor on parental mortality, health care use
and costs. We assume a linear relationship between outcome variable Y in year t of
individual i ’s parent (Yi t ), and being a doctor (Di ):
Yi t =αt +δDi +Xiβ+LCi +Ui t (4.1)
The effect of being a doctor on outcomes is captured by δ, the parameter of interest.
The vector of controls Xi includes a linear term for applicant’s age at first lottery partici-
pation80, a gender dummy, an indicator for non-western origin and fixed effects for the
birth years of child and parent. The interaction term between the lottery category and
year of first participation, LCi , controls for the fact that individuals’ chances of being
admitted are only identical conditional on lottery year and category. Lastly, αt are fixed
effects for the year in which the outcome is observed and Ui t is an individual-specific
error term.81 When estimating the effect on mortality, Y is an indicator equal to one if
the parent died before the end of the observation period, and zero otherwise. Subscript
t is then dropped and α is an intercept rather than a fixed calendar time effect.82
80Age is measured as a continuous variable in years based on exact birth dates.
81Less than 5% of the parents have more than one child participating in the lottery. In our main
analysis, these parents appear twice and we correct for this by clustering standard errors at the parent
level. The alternative is to exclude families with siblings participating in the admission lottery or to only
consider the oldest sibling we observe in our sample. In both cases, the general pattern is that p-values
increase.
82Most outcome variables are available from 2006 or later onwards (see Subsection 4.3.1) which is
at least six years after participation in the first lottery (recall that we limit the sample to parents of
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Compliance with the result of the first admission lottery is imperfect (see Subsection
4.3.2). Not all winners of the first lottery enroll in medical school, and some drop out
before completing their degree and being registered as a doctor. A substantial fraction
of lottery losers reapply in subsequent years and eventually become a doctor. To deal
with the endogeneity of becoming a doctor, we use the result of the first admission
lottery in which the applicant participated (LR1i ) as instrumental variable:
Di = κ+λLR1i +Xiθ+LCi +Vi (4.2)
All applicants to medical school participate at least once in an admission lot-
tery, so there is no sample selection when considering the outcome of the first ad-
mission lottery. Conditional on the lottery category interacted with the year of the
first application, the outcome of the first lottery is random. This ensures that the in-
dependence assumption underlying the instrumental variable approach is satisfied:
E [Ui t |Xi ,LCi ,LR1i ] = E [Ui t |Xi ,LCi ]. This is supported by the balancing shown in Table
29 and online appendix Table A1. The parameter λ describes the fraction of compli-
ers in the sample. In our setting compliers are individuals for whom the result of the
first lottery determines whether they ever become a doctor. The treatment effect δ in
equation (4.1) should be interpreted as Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE).
We run the first-stage regressions separately for fathers and mothers. The estimates
forλ are in panel A of Table 32 and show that the outcome of the first admission lottery is
a strong instrument. The F -statistics are above 3000. Winning the first lottery increases
the probability to become a doctor by 36 percentage points. Because lottery losers may
opt for other health-related fields of study or register as another type of health-care
professional, we consider two alternative first-stage regressions. Panel B shows that
winning the first lottery increases the probability to enroll in any health-related field
of study with 25 percentage points. Panel C shows that the probability to be registered
in the Dutch registry of health-care professionals, which comprises doctors, nurses,
dentists, pharmacists, midwifes, physician assistants and physiotherapists increases
with about 30 percentage points for both parents.83 Both alternative first-stages yield
somewhat smaller estimates, but they remain sizable and highly significant.
medical school applicants in the years 1988 to 1999). The exception are outcome variables retrieved from
hospitalization records which are available from 1995 onwards. For analyses based on these records,
we include parents in the sample from six years after the first lottery in which their child participated
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Table 32: First-stage estimates
Mean λ̂ s.e. F -statistic N
Panel A. Child being a doctor
Fathers 0.429 0.359 (0.007) 3030.4 20,900
Mothers 0.428 0.359 (0.006) 3128.8 21,547
Panel B. Child enrolled in a health field
Fathers 0.622 0.253 (0.006) 1847.2 20,900
Mothers 0.620 0.253 (0.006) 1895.0 21,547
Panel C. Child registered as health-care professional
Fathers 0.521 0.296 (0.006) 2168.0 20,900
Mothers 0.519 0.296 (0.006) 2215.8 21,547
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include controls for gender,
ethnicity, age at the first lottery application, fixed effects of the birth year of the applicant and parent,
and fixed effects for the lottery category interacted with the year of first lottery.
Parental mortality
Panel A in Table 33 reports the estimated causal effects of having a child who is a doctor
on fathers’ and mothers’ probability of having died by the end of 2019. The IV estimates
are small and not significantly different from zero, implying that a child who is a doctor
does not prolong parents’ life. The IV estimates are only around five percent of the
earlier reported full population correlations. Taken the size of the standard errors into
account, we can rule out with 95% probability effects on mortality larger than half the
size of the conditional correlations found in the full population (cf. Table 31). The
results are robust to restricting the sample to parents born before 1945 and considering
mortality as having died before the age of 75.
Rather than having died at a given moment in time or before a particular age, we
can consider the age of dying using duration models. For this purpose, we use a Cox
proportional hazard model on the reduced form, i.e. we use the result of the first lottery
as regressor rather than being a doctor.84 The hazard rate model includes the same
onwards.
83The registry also includes psychologists and psychotherapists, which we do not consider as health
professions as they belong to the field of social science. Including these would slightly reduce the
estimates to 0.279.
84Instrumental variable approaches do not combine easily with (non-linear) hazard rate models.
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Table 33: Effects on parental mortality
Panel A. Effect on parent died by 31-12-2019; IV estimates
Complier mean δ̂IV s.e. p-value N
Full sample
Fathers 0.1708 −0.0042 (0.0151) 0.779 20,900
Mothers 0.0965 0.0004 (0.0122) 0.976 21,547
Parents born before 1945
Fathers 0.1732 0.0115 (0.0251) 0.645 8620
Mothers 0.1035 0.0020 (0.0252) 0.937 5948
Panel B. Effect on hazard rate; Cox proportional hazard model
Baseline hazard β̂Cox s.e. p-value N
Full sample
Fathers 0.0149 0.0058 (0.0340) 0.864 20,900
Mothers 0.0083 0.0110 (0.0456) 0.809 21,547
Parents born before 1945
Fathers 0.0193 0.0333 (0.0552) 0.547 8620
Mothers 0.0108 0.0126 (0.0869) 0.885 5948
Panel C. Equality of survivor functions; Wilcoxon rank-sum tests
χ2 p-value N
Full sample
Fathers 0.00 0.980 20,900
Mothers 0.45 0.504 21,547
Parents born before 1945
Fathers 1.34 0.248 8620
Mothers 0.02 0.894 5948
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include controls for gender,
ethnicity, age at the first lottery application, fixed effects of the birth year of the applicant and parent,
and fixed effects for the lottery category interacted with the year of first lottery. The rank-sum tests in
panel C control for differences in admission probabilities by lottery categories in the different years.
regressors and fixed effects as the linear regression model discussed above. Panel B in
Table 33 presents the marginal effects. It shows estimates on the full sample and on
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the restricted sample of parents born before 1945 (potentially reaching at least age 75
during the observation period), respectively. The effects are small and not significantly
different from zero.
Finally, we conduct Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for equality of the survivor functions
between the parents of the lottery losers and the parents of the lottery winners to
investigate whether there are differences at other points in the distribution. In these
rank-sum tests we control for the lottery category interacted with the year of the first
lottery. As shown in panel C, in no case can we reject the null hypothesis of equality of
the survivor functions of lottery winners’ and losers’ parents. So all three tests show that
whether or not the child is a doctor does not affect the longevity of parents.
Parental health care use and costs
Table 34 shows the IV estimates on health care use and costs, separately for fathers
(panel A) and mothers (panel B). For fathers we find no significant effect on total health
care costs, while for mothers the effect on total health care costs is positive, equals 326
euros (11% of the control complier mean) and is significant at the 10%-level. Taking the
size of the standard errors into account, the IV estimates for total health care costs, rule
out with 95% probability effect sizes as large as 72% (for fathers) and 11% (for mothers)
of the conditional correlations for the full population as reported in Table 31. Note that
these correlations and the IV estimates have opposite signs.
When looking at separate components of health care use and costs, we see small
but marginally significant positive effects on the probability to visit a specialist for
fathers and on the probabilities of hospitalization for fathers and mothers. We find no
significant effects on any of the separate cost components. The estimates on specialist
treatment and hospital costs are, however, not very precise so that substantial effects
cannot be ruled out. Again the point estimates of the effects on the cost components
have the opposite signs of the conditional correlations reported in Table 31.
Because we consider many outcomes, we also report significance levels that correct
for multiple hypotheses testing. We follow the approach suggested by Anderson (2008)
and compute false-discovery-rate adjusted p-values referred to as FDR q-values. An-
derson (2008) shows that the FDR q-values are less conservative than the Bonferroni
correction. We compute the FDR q-values for two groups separately, i.e. the cost fac-
tors (GP costs, specialist treatment costs, pharmacy costs and hospital costs) and the
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health care use indicators (GP visit, specialist visit, any medication and hospitalization).
The estimates that were significantly different from zero at the 10% level without a
correction, are no longer significantly different from zero based on the FDR q-values.
Table 34: IV estimates of the effects of being a doctor on parental health care use and
costs
Complier mean δ̂ s.e. p-value FDR q-value
Panel A. Fathers
Total costs 3832.01 64.23 (229.49) 0.780 -
GP visit 0.8299 -0.0137 (0.0091) 0.134 0.179
GP costs 118.86 -4.68 (3.58) 0.191 0.511
Specialist visit (0/1) 0.5809 0.0282 (0.0151) 0.061 0.123
Specialist treatment costs 1851.58 203.16 (178.60) 0.255 0.511
Any medication 0.8151 0.0030 (0.0110) 0.783 0.783
Pharmacy costs 585.20 -25.75 (56.07) 0.646 0.647
Hospitalization (0/1) 0.1349 0.0108 (0.0054) 0.046 0.123
Hospital costs 2464.35 95.14 (173.76) 0.584 0.647
Panel B. Mothers
Total costs 2922.94 326.45 (192.21) 0.089 -
GP visit 0.8592 -0.0023 (0.0084) 0.787 0.787
GP costs 119.33 -3.06 (3.46) 0.377 0.377
Specialist visit (0/1) 0.5745 0.0050 (0.0144) 0.727 0.787
Specialist treatment costs 1458.67 172.39 (154.10) 0.263 0.377
Any medication 0.8373 0.0110 (0.0098) 0.264 0.529
Pharmacy costs 415.90 45.98 (51.68) 0.374 0.377
Hospitalization (0/1) 0.1255 0.0092 (0.0052) 0.079 0.317
Hospital costs 1844.97 179.99 (133.05) 0.176 0.377
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. FDR q-values are false-discovery-rate adjusted
p-values following Anderson (2008). The FDR q-values are computed separately for fathers and mothers,
and for two groups, use indicators (GP visit, specialist visit, any medication, hospitalization) and cost
factors (GP costs, specialist treatment costs, pharmacy costs, hospital costs). All specifications include
controls for gender, ethnicity, age at the first lottery application, fixed effects of the birth year of the
applicant and parent, and fixed effects for the lottery category interacted with the year of first lottery.
The estimates in Table 34 consider broad categories of health care use and costs.
In online appendix A.2 we show estimates for finer measures of health care use. We
consider the type of specialist visited by the parent (Table A2), the characteristics of
the hospital visit and the main diagnosis made in hospital (Table A3), and the type of
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medication use (Table A4). We do not find effects on the characteristics of the hospital
visit (duration, acute admission, top clinical or university medical center) at the 5%-
level, but there are a few significant effects for the type of treating specialist, hospital
diagnosis and type of medication. When we adjust for multiple hypotheses testing,
the only estimate that remains significant is that mothers of doctors are more likely
to be diagnosed with a heart failure in the hospital, which is a rare event. Overall, the
estimates do not indicate that doctors have a substantial effect on the health care use of
their parents.
We performed three heterogeneity analyses. We find some evidence that the few
significant effects in Table 34 are due to daughters and not to sons (see online appendix
Table A5). Second, we divide the applicant sample by lottery category. To get sufficient
power, we group those in categories B, C and D and those in categories E and F (see
online appendix Table A6). There are only minor differences in favor of categories E
and F (students with lower high school GPA). Third, we consider the distance between
the homes of the parent and the child.85 We split the sample in more or less than 40
kilometers travel distance. Effects are not larger if the distance is shorter (see online
appendix Table A7).
Our findings differ from those of Chen et al. (2019), who find favorable effects of
being a doctor on health outcomes of relatives in Sweden. The authors use admission
lotteries that were conducted when too many applicants had the maximum GPA from
high school, which is normally used for admission. The results of the lottery-based
analyses are complemented with results from an event study design in which health
outcomes of relatives of doctors are compared to health outcomes of relatives of lawyers.
There are several possible explanations for the different findings in the two studies.
First, lottery participants in Sweden are students with the maximum high school GPA,
while our analysis excludes students with the highest GPA’s because too few of them lost
an admission lottery. Heterogeneous effects between top students and other students
could then (partially) explain the different results.86 Second, it may be that in the
Netherlands a larger fraction of lottery losers ends up in a health-related study or
profession than in Sweden. This would dampen the effect of a doctor in the family in
85Individuals’ addresses are obtained from Statistics Netherlands (2020d).
86As we mentioned in footnote 69, there are too few (complying) lottery losers in top category A to
obtain meaningful estimates for this group.
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the Netherlands more than in Sweden. Third, the Netherlands is a small and densely
populated country where most people live close to a doctor or hospital. This may
reduce the importance of a relative with medical knowledge compared to Sweden
which is much larger and more sparsely populated. While some of our results (no
heterogeneous effects by grouped lottery categories or by distance between homes
of parent and child, and sizable and significant first stages on health-related study or
profession) lend no support to these explanations, we cannot rule them out entirely.
Finally, the data from Sweden contain information that is not included in our data, such
as diagnoses for specialist outpatient visits outside of primary care and more detailed
drug prescription data (ATC5-classification instead of ATC4). This allows them to focus
on drug prescription conditional on being diagnosed. We have mortality and health
care costs as main outcomes, which are not considered by Chen et al. (2019) in their
lottery-based analysis.
Following Chen et al. (2019) we also conducted an event study analysis in which we
compare mortality and health care use and costs between the parents of doctors and
the parents of lawyers. Online appendix B describes the analysis and reports the results.
When considering the same outcomes as Chen et al. (2019) we obtain similar results. The
results point to negative effects of having a child who is a doctor on parents’ mortality
and total health care costs, no significant effects on hospitalization and positive effects
on medication use of mothers. One interpretation of the different findings from the
lottery-based analysis and the event-study analysis is that the latter does not fully
eliminate selection bias in the Dutch setting. Alternatively, we can regard the estimates
from the two designs as different causal effects. The lottery design identifies the effect
of the child being a doctor versus the second-best profession, whereas the event-study
design identifies the effect of the child being a doctor versus being a lawyer. It can be
argued that both effects capture differences in access to the health care system, but
that the event-study estimates capture a larger gap in medical information than the
lottery-based estimates.87
87We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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4.5 Conclusion
A large literature shows that even in the presence of universal health insurance coverage
there remains inequality in access to health care. It is often argued that information
limitations about health conditions and the health care system and differences in
the capability to communicate with medical professionals are relevant drivers of this
inequality. We test the importance of these mechanisms by investigating if mortality
and health care use of parents are affected by whether or not their child is a doctor.
We document that parents have lower mortality rates and lower health care costs
when their child is a doctor. When restricting the population to parents of college
graduates, differences become smaller, but remain significant. Because doctors are
not a random subsample of all college graduates, these differences are likely to suffer
from selection bias. To estimate causal effects, we exploit admission lotteries to medical
school that took place between 1988 and 1999 in the Netherlands.
Our data contain a large range of variables describing health care use and costs.
During our observation period, the majority of the parents of the lottery applicants were
between 65 and 80 years old and thus in a phase in which health care use is substantial
and mortality not negligible. Our findings show that having a child who is a doctor has
no impact on parents’ longevity, while effects on parents’ health care use and costs are
mostly not significantly different from zero. The results do not change when splitting
the sample by gender of the child or by the distance between the homes of parent and
child. The associations we find for the general population and the population of college
graduates are thus driven by selection.
Our results imply that there are no important spillovers from the medical expertise
and connections from doctors to their parents. This suggests that the health care system
provides high-quality health care and information to all parents. We should stress,
however, that our results apply to parents of individuals who applied for medical school,
so these parents have relatively high-educated children. Therefore, our results are not





Table 35: Balancing of applicants’ characteristics by outcome of the first medical school
lottery application
Lottery winners Lottery losers p-value
Lottery category B
Female 60.1% 62.3% 0.33
Age at first application 18.0 17.9 0.58
Non-Western immigrant 5.3% 4.6% 0.83
N 1542
Lottery category C
Female 63.1% 64.1% 0.40
Age at first application 18.0 18.0 0.11
Non-Western immigrant 4.3% 4.3% 0.65
N 2359
Lottery category D
Female 60.0% 61.4% 0.31
Age at first application 18.2 18.2 0.91
Non-Western immigrant 5.8% 5.9% 0.75
N 5315
Lottery category E
Female 58.7% 60.4% 0.20
Age at first application 18.4 18.3 0.18
Non-Western immigrant 8.2% 7.8% 0.23
N 5604
Lottery category F
Female 56.9% 57.3% 0.59
Age at first application 18.6 18.5 0.07
Non-Western immigrant 11.7% 11.2% 0.20
N 7387
Notes: The p-values in the final column are weighted by the admittance probabilities for students in
different years of lottery application.
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IV-estimates for specific types of health care use
Table 36: IV-estimates of the effects of being a doctor on parental specialist visits
Complier mean δ̂ s.e. p-value FDR q-value
Panel A. Fathers
Surgery 0.0876 0.0101 (0.0080) 0.206 0.503
Neurosurgery 0.0082 0.0044 (0.0027) 0.102 0.441
Gastroenterology 0.0525 0.0006 (0.0062) 0.919 0.920
Lung specialist 0.0574 0.0064 (0.0075) 0.395 0.643
Internal medicine 0.1170 −0.0027 (0.0106) 0.797 0.890
Cardiology 0.1718 0.0120 (0.0132) 0.362 0.643
Neurology 0.0771 0.0023 (0.0076) 0.760 0.890
Rheumatology 0.0223 0.0019 (0.0053) 0.724 0.890
Geriatrics 0.0118 0.0048 (0.0027) 0.082 0.441
Ophthalmology 0.1546 −0.0132 (0.0111) 0.232 0.503
Ear, nose & throat 0.0680 0.0016 (0.0069) 0.821 0.890
Orthopedics 0.0599 0.0096 (0.0069) 0.162 0.503
Dermatology 0.1111 0.0227 (0.0102) 0.026 0.343
Panel B. Mothers
Surgery 0.1174 −0.0044 (0.0087) 0.615 0.875
Neurosurgery 0.0081 0.0004 (0.0023) 0.874 0.875
Gastroenterology 0.0536 0.0128 (0.0061) 0.034 0.440
Lung specialist 0.0514 −0.0012 (0.0065) 0.849 0.875
Internal medicine 0.1131 0.0102 (0.0100) 0.311 0.875
Cardiology 0.1031 0.0084 (0.0094) 0.374 0.875
Neurology 0.0730 −0.0025 (0.0066) 0.706 0.875
Rheumatology 0.0373 0.0043 (0.0062) 0.493 0.875
Geriatrics 0.0083 0.0008 (0.0020) 0.695 0.875
Ophthalmology 0.1536 0.0157 (0.0108) 0.147 0.875
Ear, nose & throat 0.0536 0.0041 (0.0061) 0.503 0.875
Orthopedics 0.1003 −0.0018 (0.0080) 0.820 0.875
Dermatology 0.1030 0.0113 (0.0095) 0.232 0.875
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. FDR q-values are false-discovery-rate adjusted
p-values following Anderson (2008). The FDR q-values are computed separately for fathers and mothers.
All specifications include controls for gender, ethnicity, age at the first lottery application, fixed effects of
the birth year of the applicant and parent, and fixed effects for the lottery category interacted with the
year of first lottery.
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Table 37: IV-estimates of the effects of being a doctor on parental hospitalizations
Complier mean δ̂ s.e. p-value FDR q-value
Panel A. Fathers
Hospital stay
Duration hospitalization 0.0030 0.0000 (0.0002) 0.848 0.849
Acute admission 0.0479 0.0021 (0.0029) 0.479 0.639
Top clinical 0.0597 0.0073 (0.0040) 0.070 0.238
University medical center 0.0243 0.0040 (0.0026) 0.119 0.238
Main diagnosis
Respiratory diseases 0.0075 −0.0002 (0.0011) 0.833 0.833
Abdominal hernia 0.0076 −0.0008 (0.0009) 0.395 0.833
Cholelthiasis & cholecystitis 0.0018 0.0001 (0.0004) 0.773 0.833
Lung cancer 0.0025 0.0001 (0.0005) 0.784 0.833
Prostate cancer 0.0024 0.0013 (0.0006) 0.044 0.175
Cancers 0.0192 0.0044 (0.0017) 0.010 0.122
Liver cirrhosis 0.00002 −0.0004 (0.0002) 0.038 0.175
Circulatory diseases 0.0290 −0.0010 (0.0025) 0.675 0.833
Hypert. & cerebrovasc. dis. 0.0030 0.0006 (0.0007) 0.377 0.833
Heart failure 0.0014 0.0001 (0.0005) 0.769 0.833
Heart attack 0.0035 −0.0002 (0.0006) 0.700 0.833
Other ischemic heart dis. 0.0083 −0.0005 (0.0013) 0.680 0.833
Panel B. Mothers
Hospital stay
Duration hospitalization 0.0021 0.0003 (0.0002) 0.073 0.262
Acute admission 0.0314 0.0035 (0.0023) 0.131 0.262
Top clinical 0.0514 0.0030 (0.0036) 0.403 0.538
University medical center 0.0194 0.0000 (0.0022) 0.999 0.999
Main diagnosis
Respiratory diseases 0.0056 −0.0002 (0.0008) 0.769 0.951
Abdominal hernia 0.0012 0.0001 (0.0004) 0.871 0.951
Cholelthiasis & cholecystitis 0.0021 −0.0004 (0.0005) 0.436 0.754
Lung cancer 0.0014 −0.0001 (0.0003) 0.661 0.951
Breast cancer 0.0042 −0.0005 (0.0006) 0.440 0.754
Cancers 0.0185 −0.0001 (0.0016) 0.974 0.974
Liver cirrhosis 0.0002 0.0000 (0.0002) 0.833 0.951
Circulatory diseases 0.0135 0.0026 (0.0016) 0.113 0.610
Hypert. & cerebrovasc. dis. 0.0022 −0.0005 (0.0006) 0.407 0.754
Heart failure 0.0001 0.0008 (0.0003) 0.003 0.042
Heart attack 0.0006 0.0004 (0.0003) 0.203 0.610
Other ischemic heart dis. 0.0025 0.0009 (0.0007) 0.171 0.610
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. FDR q-values are false-discovery-rate adjusted
p-values following Anderson (2008). The FDR q-values are computed separately for fathers and mothers,
and for two groups, characteristics of the hospital stay and main diagnosis. All specifications include
controls for gender, ethnicity, age at the first lottery application, fixed effects of the birth year of the
applicant and parent, and fixed effects for the lottery category interacted with the year of first lottery.
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Table 38: IV-estimates of the effects of being a doctor on parental medicine use
Complier mean δ̂ s.e. p-value FDR q-value
Panel A. Fathers
Peptic ulcer med. 0.1943 0.0237 (0.0130) 0.069 0.390
Diabetes medication 0.0899 −0.0104 (0.0108) 0.338 0.820
Antithrombotic agents 0.2505 0.0030 (0.0158) 0.851 0.952
Diuretics 0.1179 −0.0065 (0.0106) 0.540 0.876
Beta-blocking agents 0.1917 0.0009 (0.0145) 0.948 0.952
Lipid-modifying agents 0.2772 −0.0010 (0.0169) 0.952 0.952
Corticosteroids 0.1498 0.0091 (0.0091) 0.318 0.820
Penicillins 0.1326 0.0018 (0.0063) 0.775 0.952
Anti-inflamm./anti-rheum. med. 0.1643 0.0251 (0.0085) 0.003 0.053
Opioids 0.0538 0.0090 (0.0046) 0.052 0.390
Psycholeptics 0.0592 0.0009 (0.0057) 0.876 0.952
Antidepressants 0.0461 0.0042 (0.0074) 0.567 0.876
Dementia medication 0.0048 −0.0022 (0.0018) 0.206 0.820
Nasal preparations 0.0933 −0.0071 (0.0087) 0.415 0.820
Obstructive airway disease med. 0.0983 0.0077 (0.0099) 0.434 0.820
Antihistamines 0.0549 0.0012 (0.0067) 0.856 0.952
Anti-infectives 0.0437 −0.0029 (0.0036) 0.422 0.820
Panel B. Mothers
Peptic ulcer med. 0.2273 0.0234 (0.0130) 0.072 0.244
Diabetes medication 0.0474 0.0205 (0.0084) 0.015 0.128
Antithrombotic agents 0.1308 0.0062 (0.0112) 0.583 0.788
Diuretics 0.1164 0.0122 (0.0109) 0.265 0.564
Beta-blocking agents 0.1683 −0.0069 (0.0134) 0.607 0.788
Lipid-modifying agents 0.1795 0.0159 (0.0137) 0.246 0.564
Corticosteroids 0.1517 0.0065 (0.0086) 0.452 0.768
Penicillins 0.1355 0.0049 (0.0064) 0.446 0.768
Anti-inflamm./anti-rheum. med. 0.2135 0.0031 (0.0091) 0.731 0.828
Opioids 0.0694 −0.0035 (0.0056) 0.526 0.788
Psycholeptics 0.0835 0.0011 (0.0070) 0.872 0.873
Antidepressants 0.0944 0.0019 (0.0099) 0.847 0.873
Dementia medication 0.0042 −0.0024 (0.0013) 0.063 0.244
Nasal preparations 0.0996 0.0192 (0.0089) 0.031 0.178
Obstructive airway disease med. 0.0968 0.0248 (0.0100) 0.014 0.128
Antihistamines 0.0804 0.0109 (0.0082) 0.182 0.517
Anti-infectives 0.0522 −0.0018 (0.0039) 0.648 0.788
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. FDR q-values are false-discovery-rate adjusted
p-values following Anderson (2008). The FDR q-values are computed separately for fathers and mothers.
All specifications include controls for gender, ethnicity, age at the first lottery application, fixed effects of
the birth year of the applicant and parent, and fixed effects for the lottery category interacted with the
year of first lottery.
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Heterogeneity analysis
Table 39: IV-estimates of the effects of being a doctor on parental health care by gender
of the child
Sons Daughters
δ̂ s.e. p-value FDR q-value δ̂ s.e. p-value FDR q-value
Panel A. Fathers
Mortality (by 31.12.2019) -0.0015 (0.0229) 0.948 - -0.0058 (0.0200) 0.773 -
Total costs 218.46 (373.86) 0.559 - -59.11 (288.70) 0.838 -
GP visit -0.0094 (0.0137) 0.491 0.966 -0.0168 (0.0123) 0.170 0.228
GP costs -4.87 (5.40) 0.367 0.368 -4.86 (4.77) 0.308 0.797
Specialist visit (0/1) -0.0010 (0.0227) 0.966 0.966 0.0508 (0.0202) 0.012 0.049
Specialist treatment costs 702.14 (398.99) 0.078 0.314 -52.75 (204.40) 0.796 0.797
Any medication 0.0010 (0.0163) 0.951 0.966 0.0058 (0.0149) 0.695 0.696
Pharmacy costs -106.99 (99.48) 0.282 0.368 38.30 (64.75) 0.554 0.797
Hospitalization (0/1) 0.0041 (0.0083) 0.623 0.966 0.0159 (0.0073) 0.028 0.057
Hospital costs 307.35 (285.53) 0.282 0.368 -60.06 (217.23) 0.782 0.797
Panel B. Mothers
Mortality (by 31.12.2019) 0.0026 (0.0184) 0.886 - -0.0008 (0.0161) 0.960 -
Total costs 280.59 (298.71) 0.348 - 372.38 (253.53) 0.142 -
GP visit -0.0235 (0.0126) 0.063 0.252 0.0129 (0.0112) 0.248 0.331
GP costs -7.64 (5.40) 0.157 0.627 0.93 (4.61) 0.841 0.841
Specialist visit (0/1) -0.0083 (0.0219) 0.707 0.775 0.0180 (0.0192) 0.349 0.350
Specialist treatment costs -136.77 (176.23) 0.438 0.666 421.10 (243.38) 0.084 0.335
Any medication -0.0065 (0.0145) 0.657 0.775 0.0240 (0.0133) 0.072 0.145
Pharmacy costs 30.53 (71.13) 0.668 0.668 60.19 (72.79) 0.408 0.545
Hospitalization (0/1) 0.0023 (0.0081) 0.774 0.775 0.0154 (0.0069) 0.026 0.104
Hospital costs 136.48 (202.06) 0.499 0.666 215.97 (178.78) 0.227 0.455
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. FDR q-values are false-discovery-rate adjusted
p-values following Anderson (2008). The FDR q-values are computed separately for the four parent-child
pairs and within these groups for two subgroups, use indicators (GP visit, specialist visit, any medication,
hospitalization) and cost factors (GP costs, specialist treatment costs, pharmacy costs, hospital costs). All
specifications include controls for ethnicity, age at the first lottery application, fixed effects of the birth
year of the applicant and parent, and fixed effects for the lottery category interacted with the year of first
lottery.
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Table 40: IV-estimates of the effects of being a doctor on parental health care by lottery
category of the child
Categories B, C & D Categories E & F
δ̂ s.e. p-value FDR q-value δ̂ s.e. p-value FDR q-value
Panel A. Fathers
Mortality (by 31.12.2019) -0.0237 (0.0261) 0.364 - 0.0086 (0.0186) 0.645 -
Total costs 149.41 (387.65) 0.700 - 31.41 (287.94) 0.913 -
GP visit -0.0192 (0.0164) 0.240 0.439 -0.0092 (0.0110) 0.403 0.404
GP costs -2.11 (6.12) 0.730 0.764 -6.35 (4.37) 0.146 0.459
Specialist visit (0/1) 0.0209 (0.0269) 0.438 0.439 0.0353 (0.0182) 0.052 0.209
Specialist treatment costs 134.44 (279.38) 0.630 0.764 239.18 (229.97) 0.298 0.459
Any medication -0.0167 (0.0204) 0.413 0.439 0.0145 (0.0129) 0.263 0.351
Pharmacy costs 61.99 (99.99) 0.535 0.764 -65.81 (69.50) 0.344 0.459
Hospitalization (0/1) 0.0117 (0.0095) 0.219 0.439 0.0096 (0.0067) 0.148 0.297
Hospital costs 88.86 (295.96) 0.764 0.764 102.30 (217.30) 0.638 0.638
Panel B. Mothers
Mortality (by 31.12.2019) 0.0164 (0.0210) 0.436 - -0.0088 (0.0149) 0.554 -
Total costs 68.24 (302.29) 0.821 - 486.74 (245.05) 0.047 -
GP visit -0.0183 (0.0152) 0.228 0.671 0.0047 (0.0100) 0.639 0.640
GP costs -9.02 (5.97) 0.131 0.525 0.10 (4.26) 0.982 0.983
Specialist visit (0/1) -0.0119 (0.0259) 0.647 0.863 0.0144 (0.0172) 0.402 0.536
Specialist treatment costs 163.55 (193.34) 0.398 0.564 201.33 (227.91) 0.377 0.503
Any medication -0.0177 (0.0184) 0.335 0.671 0.0255 (0.0114) 0.026 0.060
Pharmacy costs -59.33 (73.96) 0.422 0.564 105.80 (68.22) 0.121 0.242
Hospitalization (0/1) -0.0002 (0.0092) 0.984 0.984 0.0139 (0.0064) 0.030 0.060
Hospital costs 39.70 (208.67) 0.849 0.850 262.71 (168.16) 0.118 0.242
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. FDR q-values are false-discovery-rate adjusted
p-values following Anderson (2008). The FDR q-values are computed separately for fathers and mothers
and grouped lottery category and within these four groups for two subgroups, use indicators (GP visit,
specialist visit, any medication, hospitalization) and cost factors (GP costs, specialist treatment costs,
pharmacy costs, hospital costs). All specifications include controls for gender, ethnicity, age at the first
lottery application, fixed effects of the birth year of the applicant and parent, and fixed effects for the
lottery category interacted with the year of first lottery.
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Table 41: IV-estimates of the effects of being a doctor on parental health care by living
distance
Distance ≤ 40km Distance > 40km
δ̂ s.e. p-value FDR q-value δ̂ s.e. p-value FDR q-value
Panel A. Fathers
Mortality (by 31.12.2019) 0.0011 (0.0136) 0.937 - 0.0086 (0.0140) 0.541 -
Total costs -113.02 (318.28) 0.723 - 192.36 (322.28) 0.551 -
GP visit -0.0041 (0.0129) 0.754 0.754 -0.0234 (0.0131) 0.073 0.208
GP costs -4.46 (4.93) 0.366 0.732 -5.54 (5.20) 0.287 0.574
Specialist visit (0/1) 0.0266 (0.0213) 0.213 0.427 0.0320 (0.0215) 0.137 0.208
Specialist treatment costs -3.66 (231.12) 0.987 0.988 353.20 (263.41) 0.180 0.574
Any medication 0.0058 (0.0153) 0.705 0.754 0.0014 (0.0159) 0.928 0.929
Pharmacy costs -106.49 (79.94) 0.183 0.732 47.96 (74.82) 0.522 0.578
Hospitalization (0/1) 0.0099 (0.0077) 0.197 0.427 0.0111 (0.0078) 0.156 0.208
Hospital costs 7.69 (245.01) 0.975 0.988 134.18 (241.05) 0.578 0.578
Panel A. Mothers
Mortality (by 31.12.2019) -0.0038 (0.0092) 0.682 - -0.0140 (0.0101) 0.167 -
Total costs 195.77 (267.33) 0.464 - 477.75 (276.77) 0.084 -
GP visit 0.0021 (0.0116) 0.858 0.859 -0.0070 (0.0121) 0.566 0.567
GP costs -2.77 (4.63) 0.550 0.682 -2.95 (5.22) 0.572 0.572
Specialist visit (0/1) -0.0091 (0.0198) 0.645 0.859 0.0205 (0.0210) 0.331 0.471
Specialist treatment costs 222.34 (245.15) 0.364 0.682 95.71 (158.55) 0.546 0.572
Any medication 0.0093 (0.0133) 0.482 0.859 0.0136 (0.0146) 0.353 0.471
Pharmacy costs 34.58 (84.14) 0.681 0.682 67.67 (60.25) 0.261 0.523
Hospitalization (0/1) 0.0044 (0.0073) 0.547 0.859 0.0140 (0.0076) 0.066 0.263
Hospital costs 83.74 (179.00) 0.640 0.682 282.97 (197.04) 0.151 0.523
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. FDR q-values are false-discovery-rate adjusted
p-values following Anderson (2008). The FDR q-values are computed separately for fathers and mothers
and by living distance and within these four groups for two subgroups, use indicators (GP visit, specialist
visit, any medication, hospitalization) and cost factors (GP costs, specialist treatment costs, pharmacy
costs, hospital costs). All specifications include controls for gender, ethnicity, age at the first lottery
application, fixed effects of the birth year of the applicant and parent, and fixed effects for the lottery
category interacted with the year of first lottery.
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Classification of hospital diagnoses and prescription drugs




Chollelthiasis and cholecystitis K80, K81




Liver cirrhosis K70, K74.3-K74.6
All circulatory diseases I00-I99
Hypertensive and cerebrovascular diseases I10-I15, I60-I69
Heart failure I11.0, I13.0, I13.2, I13.9, I50
Heart attack I21, I22, I23
Other ischemic heart diseases I20, I24, I25
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Table 43: ATC4-codes used to identify prescription drug use
Medication ATC4-code
Peptic ulcer & gastro-oesophageal reflux disease med. A02B




Lipid-modifying agents C10A, C10B








Obstructive airway disease medication R03
Antihistamines R06A
Anti-infectives S01A
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4.6.2 Event study analysis
Chen et al. (2019) have data on admission lotteries to medical school in Sweden in the
years from 2002 to 2010. In those years, 188 applicants were admitted to medical school
on the basis of a lottery and 555 applicants were rejected. To study impacts beyond
the first eight years after enrollment, they complement the results based on admission
lotteries with an event study that compares the health outcomes of doctors’ relatives
with those of relatives of graduates from law school. Law school graduates are chosen
as comparison group because they are similar on dimensions such as income, years
of education, secondary school GPA, prestige of the study program and working hours.
There may, however, also be dimensions in which they differ, such as interest in study
subjects (law vs health), (health-related) lifestyle, partner choice, fertility, etc. Chen et al.
(2019) show that in the event study, pre-trends of health outcomes are mostly similar
and differences arise around six years after enrolling in medical school. Twenty-five
years after starting the study, doctors’ relatives have 2 percentage points lower mortality
rates than relatives of lawyers.
To assess whether the differences in findings from the admission lottery design
between Chen et al’s study and ours, carry over to the event study design, we also
conducted an event study comparing health care use and mortality of the parents of
doctors to those of the parents of lawyers. We focus on the parents of registered doctors
born between 1967 and 1996 and construct a control group of parents of lawyers born
in the same years. We exclude families where at least one child has a law degree and at
least one child is a doctor. If more than one child of the remaining families has a law
degree or is a doctor, we only include the oldest sibling in the sample.
For the outcome Yi t of parent i in year t , whose oldest child started university
education in year τi we specify the following regression equation
Yi t =αt +δt−τi Di +γt−τi +ηi +Ui t (4.3)
where Di denotes the child enrolling in medical school compared to law school. Our
parameters of interest are δt−τi , where we normalize δ0 = 0. We take the year τi of
enrolling when the child is 19 years old. The general time trend in outcomes is described
by γt−τi , and αt are time fixed effects and ηi parent fixed effects. Because mortality is
defective, individual fixed effects cannot be used, so we replace ηi by θDi +Xiβ. The
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vector Xi includes controls for gender and ethnicity of the child and fixed effects for the
child’s and parent’s year of birth. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the parent.
Figure 17 shows the event study results for mortality of the father and mother up
to 25 years after matriculation. The results show that after the child started to study,
mortality is always significantly lower among the fathers of doctors than among the
fathers of lawyers. Mortality is lower among the mothers of doctors than among the
mothers of lawyers 16 years after starting the study. These results are very different
from the results based on the admission lotteries where we found no effect on parental
mortality.
Next, we present similar graphs for total health care costs (Figure 18), hospitaliza-
tion (Figure 19) and use of prescription medication (Figure 20). The event study shows
significant negative effects for total health care costs of fathers and to a lesser extent for
mothers. This is not in line with the results from the admission lotteries that did not
show an effect on total health care costs for fathers and a positive effect for mothers
that is significant at the 10%-level. We do not find effects on the probability to be hospi-
talized, which concurs with our findings using the admission lotteries. For prescription
medication use, the event study shows no effects for fathers, but significantly positive
effects for mothers, though not consistently. These findings are again in contrast to the
ones we found in Tables 8 and 38 which show no significant differences.
Figure 17: Parents’ mortality by year since start study of their child - event study
(a) Fathers (b) Mothers
Note: Estimates (with confidence intervals) from an event study comparing the parents of doctors and
lawyers.
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Figure 18: Parents’ total health care costs by year since start study of their child - event
study
(a) Fathers (b) Mothers
Note: Estimates (with confidence intervals) from an event study comparing the parents of doctors and
lawyers.
Figure 19: Parents’ hospitalization by year since start study of their child - event study
(a) Fathers (b) Mothers
Note: Estimates (with confidence intervals) from an event study comparing the parents of doctors and
lawyers.
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Figure 20: Parents’ medication use by year since start study of their child - event study
(a) Fathers (b) Mothers





This thesis consists of three chapters that empirically investigate the effects of edu-
cational choices on later-life family outcomes. This chapter summarizes the main
results and conclusions from the previous chapters and briefly discusses their policy
implications.
Chapter 2 studies the relationship between field of study and family outcomes. It
uses administrative data from 16 cohorts of the Dutch population to first document
considerable variation by field of study for a range of family outcomes. To estimate
causal effects, centrally-executed admission lotteries that created randomization into
four oversubscribed study programs are exploited. These programs are medicine, den-
tistry, veterinary medicine and international business. The estimated effects are based
on the contrast between family outcomes of applicants who won the first admission
lottery and completed their preferred field of study and family outcomes of applicants
who lost the first lottery and ended up in their next-best field. Thereby, the result of the
first lottery participation is used as an instrument for study program completion.
The results show that the field of study matters for a range of family outcomes, such
as the probability to have a partner, the level and field of education of the partner,
fertility as well as earnings of the partner and the household. There is also evidence
of intergenerational effects on children’s probability to enroll in the highest track of
secondary education. The effects are heterogeneous with respect to study program and
gender, but the results overall show that field of study does not only affect labor market
outcomes but also causally influences other important dimensions of a person’s life.
126 5. Summary
The chapter demonstrates that field of study strongly affects partner choice, in
particular for studies that train for a profession with occupational licensing. These
matching patterns affect households’ resources, but also have some fertility and in-
tergenerational effects, that prospective students should be aware of to make fully
informed study choices. The latter ultimately determine how society is shaped and may,
for instance, contribute to household income inequality (Eika et al., 2019).
Chapter 3 investigates the role of household specialization based on comparative
advantage as a cause of the earnings penalty that women, but not men, experience
after having their first child. If household specialization occurs, then the higher-earning
partner focuses on labor market work, while the lower-earning partner specializes
in child rearing and household production. Using administrative data and applying
an event-study methodology centered around the birth of the first child, the chapter
first confirms the existence of a large and persistent earnings child penalty on Dutch
women, that is predominantly caused by reductions in working hours. It also documents
differences in the child penalty by individuals’ level of education and field of study.
Importantly, the findings across various proxies for (relative) earnings potential
consistently show little evidence of household specialization based on comparative
advantage and/or bargaining power. While women’s earnings losses and reductions
in labor supply are indeed smaller if they have a higher relative earnings capacity, par-
enthood has hardly any effects on men irrespective of their relative earnings potential.
Differences in women’s labor market trajectories thus seem to be driven by differences
in their absolute earnings potential, such that higher-educated/higher-earning women
remain more attached to the workforce after having children. Descriptive evidence
indicates that these women make more use of formal child care to combine work and
family.
The chapter shows that even in a country where it is possible and presumably
accepted that men work part-time, few men do so after the arrival of their first child.
This is even true in couples where the mother has a higher earnings potential than the
father. Women instead seem to reduce the child penalty — and protect their investment
in human capital — by using (formal) child care. Lower-educated women make less
use of this option though it is possible that women who want to spend more time with
their children invest less in education. The findings from this chapter may have two
implications. First, family policies such as paid paternity leave could stimulate men to
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take on a larger role in child rearing and make them more aware of the labor market
potential of mothers. Second, providing sufficient and affordable access to formal
child care seems to be important for keeping well-educated women working more than
part-time after having children (Andresen and Nix, 2019; Lefebvre and Merrigan, 2008).
Chapter 4 assesses the importance of unequal access to medical expertise and
services as a driver of health inequalities. To that end, admission lotteries to medical
school in the Netherlands are exploited to estimate the causal effects of having a child
who is a doctor on parents’ mortality and health care use and costs. Doctors’ parents
presumably have full access to medical expertise and services via their children, so that
their health care is not affected by information limitations.
The findings indicate that having a child who is a doctor has no impact on parents’
longevity, while effects on parents’ health care use and costs are mostly not significantly
different from zero. Further analysis also shows little evidence of heterogeneity by the
gender of the child, by the distance between the homes of parent and child and by
the child’s lottery category. The associations found for the general population and the
population of college graduates are thus driven by selection.
The results imply that there are no important spillovers from the medical expertise
and connections of doctors to their parents. The Dutch health care system provides
sufficient access to people who do not have network connections in the medical sector.
The findings also suggest that information interventions aimed to educate people about
health risks and preventive behavior may have limited success as a means to lower
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